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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the class action certification hearing has become
the latest forum for disputes over the reliability of expert testimony.1

∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2004, Florida State University College of Law; B.A., Vanderbilt University, 2000. I would like to thank Thomas Burch for his laughter and constant
encouragement and my family for their faithful support and loving wisdom. Special thanks
to Professor Greg Mitchell, who makes complex litigation comprehensible, and to Matt
Simmonds and the Law Review for their exemplary work throughout the laborious editing
process. All errors are my own.

1041

1042

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1041

Since these hearings may involve complex technical matters, litigants frequently try to introduce expert testimony to either establish
or challenge the basic requirements for class certification.2 Yet most
courts do not conduct a Daubert analysis before admitting expert testimony during certification,3 evaluate the evidence according to a
uniform standard, or adequately weigh opposing expert opinions.4
Even though the Federal Rules of Evidence codify procedures designed to ensure the reliability of expert testimony,5 courts have been
reluctant to employ those procedures during class certification.6 This
hesitation arises primarily from a fear of moving into the substantive
merits of the case.7 Certifying a class based on unreliable expert testimony may force courts to decertify the class later in the process, encourage frivolous suits that strong-arm risk-averse defendants into
settlement,8 waste judicial resources, and undermine the legitimate
purposes of the class action mechanism. Ideally, to make a fair and
informed decision on certification, judges should use the wide latitude afforded by the current gray area between the Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin9 prohibition on an inquiry into the case’s merits and the
General Telephone Co. v. Falcon10 rigorous analysis requirement to:
(1) routinely apply Daubert as a precursor to admitting expert evidence; (2) adequately weigh opposing expert opinions and other evidence; and (3) employ a preponderance of the evidence standard to
determine the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s proof. The court could
then resolve ambiguities in favor of the plaintiffs and err on the side
of certification.11

1. See Cari K. Dawson, Combating Class Certification Experts: Potential Strategies
for Defendants, 72 U.S.L.W. 2051, 2051 (Aug. 5, 2003); Alice A. Kelly & Joy L. Holley, Using Daubert to Oppose Class Action Certification, 4 ANDREWS DIET DRUGS LITIG. REP. 6, 6
(2001).
2. See Kelly & Holley, supra note 1, at 6.
3. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
4. Courts have an independent obligation to conduct their own inquiry into whether
the plaintiff met the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1188 (11th Cir. 2003); MartinezMendoza v. Champion Int’l Corp., 340 F.3d 1200, 1216 n.37 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting
McGowan v. Faulkner Concrete Pipe Co., 659 F.2d 554, 559 (5th Cir. 1981)).
5. See FED. R. EVID. 702, 703.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See id.; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin prohibits courts from evaluating the substantive merits of a case during class certification. 417 U.S. 155, 178 (1974).
8. See infra Part VI.A.
9. 417 U.S. at 178. Part II.A. further explains the merit inquiry.
10. 457 U.S. 146, 161 (1982). The Supreme Court’s requirement that courts conduct a
rigorous analysis to determine whether evidence satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is further discussed infra Part II.A.
11. The burden of proof during class certification has not been adequately addressed
in case law. However, since the typical burden of proof in civil cases is a “preponderance of
the evidence,” courts should require plaintiffs to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
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This Comment takes a closer look at the judicial handling of experts in federal class certification hearings, the amount of proof required for certification, and the means courts employ to evaluate the
sufficiency of evidence. This Comment ultimately argues that courts
should admit expert affidavits and reports only if they survive an initial Daubert analysis.12 Part II begins by briefly outlining the prerequisites for certifying a class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and analyzes the variations in Supreme Court decisions that have led to confusion during certification. Part II also discusses the ambiguous threshold of proof courts use to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence offered to satisfy Rule 23. Part III then explains the Daubert analysis and remarks on the ways in which parties rely on experts to prove or disprove the Rule 23 certification requirements. Part IV examines the misinterpretation of Federal Rule
of Evidence 1101 as a possible root cause for the failure of courts to
apply the Federal Rules of Evidence during certification. It also discusses how the judiciary has responded to Daubert challenges and
how seriously courts examine expert evidence once it is admitted.
Part V of this Comment focuses on ways to institute a principled
approach to expert evidence in class certification. Courts admit expert evidence via affidavits in both summary judgment and class certification hearings. In summary judgment hearings, courts employ
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Part V.A suggests that the application
of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the summary judgment process
provides a viable starting point for discussion on the implementation
of evidentiary rules in class certification proceedings. Part V.B then
that they have met the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See infra Part II.B.
12. Courts should use Daubert when evaluating whether the class meets the certification requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; however, different
concerns arise in class settlement. Under the amendments to Rule 23(e), which entered
into effect on December 1, 2003, courts are required to approve “any settlement, voluntary
dismissal, or compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(e) (as amended). Consequently, if the court employs a Daubert analysis prior to certification, then it will be a non-issue in settlement proceedings.
For information about the courts’ role in class action settlements prior to the amendments, see BERNARD J. BONN III & ANDREW J. HATCHEY, CONTRIBUTION, INDEMNITY AND
SETTLEMENT ISSUES IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION (1993); Fred Misko, Jr. &
Frank E. Goodrich, Managing Complex Litigation: Class Actions and Mass Torts, 48
BAYLOR L. REV. 1001, 1046-54 (1996); Vince Morabito, Judicial Supervision of Individual
Settlements with Class Members in Australia, Canada, and the United States, 38 TEX.
INT’L. L.J. 663, 717-23 (2003); Mollie A. Murphy, The Intersystem Class Settlement: Of
Comity, Consent, and Collusion, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 413, 436 (1999); Joseph F. Rice &
Nancy Worth Davis, The Future of Mass Tort Claims: Comparison of Settlement Class Action to Bankruptcy Treatment of Mass Tort Claims, 50 S.C. L. REV. 405, 418 (1999); Tower
C. Snow, Jr. et al., Defending Securities Class Actions, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY;
SECUTITIES LITIGATION: PLANNING AND STRATEGIES 177, 248 (May 8-9, 2003); Mark C.
Weber, A Consent-Based Approach to Class Action Settlement: Improving Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155 (1998).
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elaborates on a potential framework and a rationale for the use of
Daubert in class certification, taking into account the summary
judgment process, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Part VI addresses two important changes in the landscape of class
action certification: the use of certification to blackmail defendants
into settlement, and the possibility that Congress will pass a “class
action fairness act.” Part VI.A explains how courts could use Daubert
to fulfill their duty to independently evaluate the evidence and to
minimize the potential for coercion in the event of weak class certification claims. Part VI.B anticipates the possibility that Congress
may pass a class action fairness act, and proposes that federal courts
could lessen the potential additional burden on the judiciary if they
weighed the evidence offered for certification and utilized Daubert
before admitting expert testimony.
Finally, Part VII outlines the broad discretion given to the district
courts through both Rule 23(d) and the abuse of discretion standard
of review. Part VII argues that courts should use their discretion to
conduct a Daubert analysis and to sufficiently weigh the proof offered
for Rule 23 before ruling on certification.
II. CLASS CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 23
To understand how and why Daubert should apply during class
certification, it is helpful to first review both the functions and the
certification requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.13 Class actions serve two primary functions: (1) promoting
judicial economy through the efficient resolution of multiple claims in
one case, and (2) providing an opportunity for persons with small
claims to assert their rights.14 Since the decision to certify a class lies
within the trial court’s “considered discretion,” the trial judge should
be ever mindful of these two functions.15

13. The amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which became effective on
December 1, 2003, do not affect this Comment’s analysis. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (see material
appended to Rule 23 for amendment); see also supra note 12. The amendments relate to
Rule 23(c), (e), (g), and (h) which govern the appointment of class counsel, settlement, notice requirements, and attorneys’ fees.
14. See O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 318 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
15. Doninger v. Pac. N.W. Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1309 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting
Price v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 501 F.2d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1974)); O’Connor, 184 F.R.D. at
318 (“In certifying a class, the court should keep in mind the dual purposes of Rule 23: (1)
to promote judicial economy through the efficient resolution of multiple claims in a single
action; and (2) to provide persons with smaller claims, who would otherwise be economically precluded from doing so, the opportunity to assert their rights.”); 7A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1754, at 49 n.1 (2d ed. 1986).
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A. Terms and Conditions of Rule 23
Before the court considers the requirements of Rule 23, it should
determine the existence of an “identifiable class.”16 This means that
the plaintiffs should provide the court with a precise description of
who is included in the class and who would be bound by the class
judgment.17 This common law requirement allows the court to determine the suitability of a case for certification and ensures that those
allegedly harmed by the defendant will actually receive any relief
granted.18 After adequately defining the class, the party seeking class
certification bears the burden of proving that the putative class action satisfies the four requirements of Rule 23(a):19
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact in common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.20

16. Jerold S. Solovy et al., Class Action Controversies, in 2 CURRENT PROBLEMS IN
FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 7, 44 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No.
431, 1992), available at WL 431 PLI/Lit 7; see also Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation:
Certification Burdens, NAT’L L.J., July 3, 2000, at A14.
17. Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 44; see also Mullenix, supra note 16, at A14. This
requirement is tied to former Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(3) (this changed when
the amendments to Rule 23 went into effect on December 1, 2003). See Solovy et al., supra
note 16, at 39. Certification of overly broad or vague classes is improper. Id.; see also
David Crump, What Really Happens During Class Certification? A Primer for the FirstTime Defense Attorney, 10 REV. LITIG. 1, 12 (1990). The definition of the class cannot be
vague or difficult to apply and should instead use objective terms “capable of present ascertainment.” MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 30.14 (1985).
18. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 670 (7th Cir. 1981); Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 37.
If a court certifies a class that is “too narrowly defined,” it cannot adjudicate and vindicate
the rights of those who were injured. Id. at 45.
19. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 2003)
(“The burden of proof to establish the propriety of class certification rests with the advocate of the class.”); Heaven v. Trust Co. Bank, 118 F.3d 735, 737 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating
that the burden of satisfying the requirements of Rule 23 is on the plaintiff); Horton v.
Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 486 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that the plaintiff
bears the burden of proof that the class prerequisites have been satisfied); Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1099 (5th Cir. 1975).
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). The 1966 revision of this rule adopted a pragmatic approach
to class treatment and listed four functional reasons for the class action: (1) preventing serious litigation-related unfairness for both defendants and class members, (2) ensuring
remedial efficacy, (3) promoting law enforcement, and (4) facilitating litigation efficiency.
Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE
L.J. 1251, 1259-60 (2002). Adequacy of class representation has also developed into a heavily litigated area. The analysis determining whether class representation is adequate asks,
first, “whether any substantial conflicts of interest exist between the representatives and
the class,” and second, “whether the representatives will adequately prosecute the action.”
In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.R.D. 447, 460-61 (N.D. Ala. 2003). To defeat a
party’s claim to class certification, the conflict must be “fundamental” and targeted at the
specific issues in controversy. Valley Drug Co., 350 F.3d at 1189; WRIGHT ET AL., supra
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After meeting the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), the putative class
must qualify under one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b).21
Plaintiffs may opt to use Rule 23(b)(1) where a multitude of individual plaintiffs might create inconsistent standards or impair the interests of nonparties.22 A court may certify a class action under Rule
23(b)(2) if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class,” which makes injunctive or
declaratory relief applicable to the entire class.23 Plaintiffs should not
employ a Rule 23(b)(2) action if they seek monetary damages since
the drafters envisioned this section as a suitable means for adjudicating civil rights, consumer rights, and patent rights.24 Rule 23(b)(3)
applies when questions of law or fact common to the entire class predominate over questions affecting individual class members and class
resolution provides the superior method for adjudication.25
To determine the superiority of a class action under Rule 23(b)(3),
the court must make specific findings to determine:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; [and] (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action.26

note 15, § 1768, at 326-27. When some party members’ claims have been harmed by the
same conduct that benefited other members of the class, a fundamental conflict exists. Valley Drug Co., 350 F.3d at 1189.
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). A court may also certify a class as a “hybrid action” under
Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). See, e.g., Midwestern Mach. v. N.W. Airlines, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 562,
570 (D. Minn. 2001). Where there is a hybrid class, the court first resolves issues of liability under 23(b)(2), and then the damages issue using the “opt-out” procedures of Rule
23(b)(3). See id.; see also Shores v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., No. 95-1162-CIV-T-25(E), 1996
WL 407850, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 1996). Ordinarily, judges have broad discretion in
determining whether the requirements of Rule 23(a) and one of the requirements of Rule
23(b) have been met. See Williams v. Weinberger, 360 F. Supp. 1349, 1352 (N.D. Ga. 1973);
Southern v. Bd. of Transp. for Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 318 F. Supp. 355, 359-60 (N.D. Tex.
1970). If a class that is not certifiable under the rule can be redefined to meet the prerequisites, then the court does not have to dismiss it. See Geraghty v. United States Parole
Comm’n, 719 F.2d 1199, 1205 (3d Cir. 1983); see also DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733,
734 (5th Cir. 1970); Shivelhood v. Davis, 336 F. Supp. 1111, 1113 (D. Vt. 1971).
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).
23. Id. at (b)(2).
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note; Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 38.
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Dwight J. Davis & Karen R. Kowalski, Use and Misuse of
Expert Opinions at the Class Certification Stage, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 285, 286 (2002); Solovy
et al., supra note 16, at 39.
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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The plaintiff must also choose a member of the class as the class representative.27 For purposes of certification, the court asks whether
the plaintiffs provided sufficient proof to satisfy the prerequisites of
Rule 23, not whether the stated cause of action will prevail on the
merits.28
Although the certification requirements appear straightforward,
several Supreme Court decisions provide judges with somewhat inconsistent guidelines for conducting the certification analysis. In
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, the Court prohibited judges from conducting a “preliminary inquiry into the merits of a proposed class action” at the certification stage.29 The Court reasoned that Rule 23 did
not authorize an inquiry into the merits,30 and worried that a merits
determination would “color the subsequent proceedings and place an
unfair burden on the defendant” without trial safeguards.31 An inquiry into the merits would give plaintiffs the benefits of a class action prior to certification.
Yet, in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, the Court observed that an
‘“[e]valuation of many of the questions entering into [the] determination of class action questions is intimately involved with the merits of
the claims.’”32 Finally, without ever directly questioning its previous
decisions, the Court, in General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, stated that
district courts may certify class actions only if they are satisfied after
a “rigorous analysis” that the case meets each of the prerequisites of
Rule 23(a).33 Since this decision, courts have struggled to conduct
Falcon’s “rigorous analysis” while avoiding Eisen’s prohibition of a
preliminary inquiry into the merits.34

27. This requirement is generally known as the “standing” or “adequacy” requirement. Mullenix, supra note 16, at A14. A named plaintiff cannot assert claims on behalf of
a putative class when he or she was not personally injured. Vuyanich v. Republic Nat’l
Bank, 723 F.2d 1195, 1200 (5th Cir. 1984).
28. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 154, 178 (1974) (prohibiting a preliminary inquiry into the merits of the case).
29. Id. at 178. Other courts have argued that a court cannot make a Rule 23 determination “without at least a preliminary exploration of the merits.” Sanders v. Robinson
Humphrey/Am. Express, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 n.8 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (citing ARTHUR
MILLER, AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 15 (2d
ed. 1977)).
30. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178.
31. Id. at 178-79 (stating that part of the plaintiffs’ burden is paying for the costs of
the litigation).
32. 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.12 (1978) (quoting 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3911, at 485 n.45 (1976)).
33. 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
34. Bone & Evans, supra note 20, at 1268. Some commentators advocate conducting
class certification on the merits of the claim. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Class Certification Based on Merits of the Claims, 69 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2001).
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B. Proving the Rule 23 Requirements: How Much Proof Constitutes
Sufficient Evidence?
This struggle between conducting a rigorous analysis and avoiding the merits inquiry is caused, in part, by a lack of guidance on the
quantum of proof needed to satisfy the Rule 23 requirements. When
litigants offer expert affidavits or statistics to prove the requisites of
Rule 23, the court must make two distinct determinations. First, the
court must decide whether to admit the expert evidence. Although
courts have traditionally employed a low threshold for admissibility
during class certification, they should use a higher standard to filter
unreliable evidence.35
Second, the court must determine how much weight to give to that
expert evidence as it decides whether the totality of the plaintiffs’
evidence provides sufficient proof of the Rule 23 requirements. Rule
23 is silent on the standard of proof;36 however, the typical burden of
proof in a civil suit is a “preponderance of the evidence.”37 Most court
opinions simply ask whether the plaintiffs’ evidence, expert or otherwise, sufficiently demonstrates the requirements of Rule 23.38 Certification opinions provide surprisingly little elaboration or guidance
on what constitutes “sufficient” evidence. Even though a preponderance of the evidence standard makes the most sense in this type of
civil proceeding, without a clear mandate for its use, the standard
changes on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis.39
On one end of the spectrum, the Eleventh Circuit held that when
plaintiffs choose not to proffer any evidence at all in support of a
Rule 23 requirement, they fail to meet their burden of providing suf-

35. Certifying a class with unreliable evidence may increase the possibility of coercing
the defendants into settlement. See infra Part VI.A.
36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
37. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983); Gary Lawson,
Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 870 (1992).
38. See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir.
2001) (asking whether the plaintiffs’ evidence is sufficient); Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 292 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding that the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence supported a finding of commonality); Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 205 F.R.D.
466, 470 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (“The appropriate inquiry is whether the statistics ‘are sufficient
to show . . . the existence of common questions.’” (quoting Hopewell v. Univ. of Pitt., 79
F.R.D. 689, 693 (W.D. Pa. 1978)); Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D.
655, 667 n.14 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (denying class certification because plaintiffs made “little effort to show how proving the elements of their individual claims [would] also prove the
claims of the absent class members,” but not stating what constitutes sufficient evidence to
prove these claims); In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 996 F. Supp. 18, 24 (N.D.
Ga. 1997) (finding that the plaintiff offered “sufficient evidence,” but failing to indicate
what standard the court used to determine sufficiency).
39. See generally Part IV.B.2. For additional information on minimizing the rate of
error in the preponderance of the evidence standard, see Vern R. Walker, Preponderance,
Probability and Warranted Factfinding, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1075, 1099-1104 (1996).
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ficient evidence.40 When other courts evaluate expert evidence, they
have certified classes where the methodologies show a “reasonable
probability” of establishing the plaintiffs’ claims,41 when plaintiffs
demonstrate a “colorable method” of proof,42 and even where the proposed methods are not “so insubstantial as to amount to no method
at all.”43 The Eleventh Circuit held that courts have a duty to conduct
an independent inquiry into whether the plaintiffs’ evidence satisfies
Rule 23 regardless of whether defendants contest the issue.44 Yet,
many courts fail to weigh contested evidence, much less conduct their
own inquiry.45
Contrary to these relaxed evidentiary thresholds, the Supreme
Court noted that absent clear proof, “significant proof” of the Rule 23
requirements could justify certifying a class.46 Although the certification process contains some flexibility to enhance the usefulness of the
class action device, the Court stated that “actual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains, however, indispensable.”47 The
Court emphasized that a trial court may certify a class only if it concludes, “after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)
have been satisfied.”48 Consequently, it seems that the Court requires
at least a preponderance of the evidence standard. When lower
courts certify classes based on expert evidence that demonstrates
only a “colorable method” of proof,49 or where the method is not “so
insubstantial as to amount to no method at all,”50 it may not be more
likely than not that the plaintiffs satisfied Rule 23(a).
40. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1196 (11th Cir. 2003).
41. In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 182 F.R.D. 85, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
42. In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig., 170 F.R.D. 524, 531 (M.D. Fla.
1996).
43. In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R.D. 682, 697 (D. Minn. 1995).
44. Valley Drug Co., 350 F.3d at 1188.
45. See, e.g., In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d
Cir. 2001) (refusing to weigh opposing expert evidence that offered conflicting opinions on
whether the plaintiffs could establish common questions of fact for certification).
46. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982).
47. Id. at 160.
48. Id.
49. See In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig., 170 F.R.D. 524, 531 (M.D. Fla.
1996). In this case, replacement contact lens purchasers brought an antitrust action
against Johnson & Johnson Vision Products, Inc., Bausch & Lomb, Inc. and CIBA Vision
Corporation, the largest contact lens manufacturers in the United States, id. at 527. The
plaintiffs alleged that these manufacturers conspired among themselves, along with two
trade organizations, to “restrict the supply of replacement contact lenses.” Id. As such, the
contact lenses were marked-up at “supracompetitive” prices. Id. The district court granted
the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Id. at 533. In doing so, the court stated that the
“[p]laintiffs have demonstrated at least a ‘colorable method’ of proving impact at trial . . . .
That Defendants’ expert disagrees with the methodology and conclusions propounded by
[the plaintiffs’ expert] is not reason to deny class certification.” Id. at 531 (internal citations omitted).
50. In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R.D. 682, 697 (D. Minn. 1995). Potash is “a
mineral typically mined from land deposits,” and is used in the United States for fertilizer
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Without a uniform threshold of proof, the amount of proof that
constitutes “sufficient evidence” may continue to reflect the personal
preferences of the court rather than the adequacy of the plaintiffs’
proof. Courts should affirmatively adopt a preponderance of the evidence standard and determine, after considering all of the evidence,
whether the plaintiff supplied sufficient proof to satisfy Rule 23(a).
Weighing the evidence forces judges to envision how the class action might develop, and thus forms an almost inseparable relationship between the prerequisites of a class action and the substantive
merits.51 Even though a court should not decide the merits of the case
during certification, it “can and should consider the merits of the case
to the degree necessary to determine whether the requirements of
Rule 23 will be satisfied.”52 The post-Eisen decisions demonstrate
that the rigorous application of Rule 23 requires the court to analyze
the evidence even if the scrutiny overlaps the merits of the case.53
Despite the court’s duty to determine whether the plaintiffs satisfied
Rule 23(a), even in the event that the inquiry touches the merits,54
judges often err on the side of caution by giving evidence remotely related to the merits a wide berth.55 As a result, the chances of a court
certifying a class that, more likely than not, does not meet the Rule
23 requirements increases.
Three general practices hinder the court in making informed and
fair certification decisions: (1) most courts do not regularly employ
Daubert standards before admitting expert evidence and can certify a
class based on flawed evidence, (2) courts do not seriously weigh the
evidence offered or apply a uniform standard to judge whether the
plaintiffs produced sufficient proof to satisfy Rule 23, and (3) courts
production. Id. at 686 n.1. In Potash, fertilizer producers in the United States alleged that
the potash producers violated the Sherman Act by “conspiring to raise, fix, maintain, and
stabilize the wholesale price of potash.” Id. at 686. The fertilizer producer plaintiffs alleged that they were injured by having to pay artificially high prices. Id. The district court
granted their motion. Id. at 700. In its decision to certify the class, the court stated:
In assessing whether to certify a class, the Court’s inquiry is limited to whether
or not the proposed methods are so insubstantial as to amount to no method at
all. This relaxed standard flows from the equitable notion that the wrongdoer
should not be able to profit by insistence on an unattainable standard of proof.
Id. at 697 (citations omitted).
51. Bone & Evans, supra note 20, at 1268.
52. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1188 n.15 (11th Cir.
2003).
53. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160; Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.12
(1978); Disposable Contact Lens, 170 F.R.D. at 528 (observing that the principle requiring
courts not to consider the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims should not be invoked so rigidly so
as “to artificially limit a trial court’s examination of the factors necessary to make a reasoned determination of whether Rule 23 has been satisfied”); Brief of Amici Curiae Am.
Bankers Assoc. et al. at 13, In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124
(2d Cir. 2001); Bone & Evans, supra note 20, at 1276-77.
54. Valley Drug Co., 350 F.3d at 1188 n.15.
55. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 321 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
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resolve ambiguities in favor of plaintiffs and err on the side of certifying the class.56 Ideally, to make a reasonable and informed decision
on certification, courts should apply Daubert as the standard for admissibility of expert evidence, weigh opposing expert opinions as well
as the totality of the evidence, and employ a preponderance of the
evidence standard to determine the sufficiency of the evidence. The
court could then resolve ambiguities in favor of the plaintiffs and err
on the side of certification.
III. THE USE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY TO SATISFY RULE 23
In negotiating the unpredictable area of class certification, litigants present the courts with numerous expert opinions in the form
of affidavits and reports.57 These reports may aid the judge in determining whether the plaintiffs established the requirements in Rule
23.58 Traditionally, before admitting expert testimony, the testimony
must survive scrutiny under Rules 702 and 703 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence.59 The rules advisory committee drafted the Rules of Evidence to “secure fairness in administration, eliminat[e] unjustifiable
expense and delay, and promot[e] growth and development of the law
of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.”60
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 702: Daubert & Kumho Tire
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows experts to testify, so long as they base their testimony on “sufficient facts or data,”
use “reliable principles and methods,” and apply those principles and
methods “reliably to the facts of the case.”61 Two Supreme Court decisions, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.62 and Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael,63 provide the foundation for the rule. In

56. See In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 182 F.R.D. 85, 88 (S.D.N.Y 1998). The court in
Sumitomo noted that “[t]he Second Circuit has directed district courts to apply Rule 23 according to a liberal rather than a restrictive interpretation.” The court then quoted Green
v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1968), which stated “if there is to be an error
made, let it be in favor and not against the maintenance of the class action, for it is always
subject to modification should later developments during the course of the trial so require.”
Id. While this statement complies with the flexibility in Rule 23, the Supreme Court has
cautioned that “actual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains, however, indispensable.” Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160.
57. Mandi L. Williams, Note, The History of Daubert and Its Effect on Toxic Tort
Class Action Certification, 22 REV. LITIG. 181, 202 (2003).
58. See Nancy J. Moore, Class Action Experts Discuss Key Decisions, New Rules, and
Litigation Strategies, 4 Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 818 (Nov. 14, 2003).
59. FED. R. EVID. 702, 703.
60. FED. R. EVID. 102.
61. FED. R. EVID. 702.
62. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
63. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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Daubert, the Court required trial judges to act as “gatekeepers” by
excluding unreliable and irrelevant scientific testimony.64 In Kumho
Tire, the question before the Court was whether Daubert’s fundamental gatekeeping obligation applied to only scientific testimony, or
if it applied to all expert testimony.65 In holding that the gatekeeping
obligation applied to all expert testimony, the Court reiterated that
Rules 702 and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence give experts testimonial latitude “on the ‘assumption that the expert’s opinion will
have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.’”66 The Kumho Court expressed a fundamental concern with
expert reliability.67 As such, Rule 702 requires ‘“a valid . . . connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.’”68
To aid the courts in their gatekeeping function, the Supreme
Court suggested a non-exclusive checklist to use in assessing expert
reliability.69 These factors may include: (1) whether the expert’s
methods or theories can be tested; (2) whether the technique has
been published and subjected to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the existence of standards and controls; and (5)
whether the method has been generally accepted in the scientific
community.70
In addition to looking at any relevant factors, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires the trial court to determine whether
the expert properly applied the scientifically valid methods and principles to the facts of the case.71 This prevents a situation where a
party would, for example, call a NASA aeronautical engineer to give
a medical analysis of an asbestos plaintiff.72 Under Rule 702, the expert must demonstrate a proper basis for any assumptions made
64. 509 U.S. at 589.
65. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147.
66. Id. at 148 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592); see also JOHN W. STRONG,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13, at 59-60 (5th ed. 1999).
67. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149.
68. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).
69. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note concerning the 2000 amendment.
70. Id. The last factor stems from the “general acceptance test” articulated in Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
71. FED. R. EVID. 702. For information on the methodology used in toxic tort cases,
see Michael C. McCarthy, Note, “Helpful” or “Reasonably Reliable”? Analyzing the Expert
Witness’s Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
350 (1992).
72. In Daubert, the Supreme Court used phases of the moon to give an example on
relevancy, stating:
The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may provide valid scientific
“knowledge” about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact
in issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact. However (absent creditable
grounds supporting such a link), evidence that the moon was full on a certain
night will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an individual was
unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that night.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).

2004]

FEDERAL CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION

1053

about the facts of the case if he or she wants to give an opinion based
on those facts.73
To decide whether Rule 702 applies to expert testimony, the court
must ascertain “pursuant to [Federal Rule of Evidence] 104(a),
whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge
that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact
in issue.”74 The court must make this determination in all cases
where the “testimony reflects scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge.”75 Despite the Supreme Court’s all-inclusive language,
most courts determining whether a class meets the requirements of
Rule 23 do not apply the Federal Rules of Evidence or perform their
gatekeeping function during certification.76
The changing role of the class certification hearing may partially
explain why judges refuse to act as gatekeepers during the certification process. Traditionally, the court acted as a guardian for the interests of the absent class members and assumed a responsibility to
adequately protect those interests.77 The entire class action resembled
a “quasi-administrative” action rather than a traditional lawsuit with
clearly defined roles for the litigants.78 Today, however, the class certification hearing resembles a trial where parties vigorously attack
and defend their positions on certification.
Litigants commonly use expert testimony to support or oppose motions for class certification.79 Yet, the court’s approach to certification
retains the trappings of traditional administrative procedure and has
not adjusted to the increased use of expert witnesses. Although this
Comment will further develop the ways in which courts should adapt
to the proliferation of experts in Part V, it is first helpful to understand how plaintiffs and defendants use expert opinions during certification. In general, plaintiffs may rely on an expert to demonstrate

73. STRONG, supra note 66, § 13, at 64-65. The fact in issue during class certification
is whether the class satisfies Rule 23.
74. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 (footnote omitted).
75. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999).
76. See infra Part IV.B.
77. Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 43. Today the court should still act as a guardian
for absent class members; however, it should exercise this duty in a slightly different way.
In light of the changing environment of class actions, the court should act as a guardian for
the class by conducting an independent inquiry into whether the plaintiffs sufficiently
proved the requirements of Rule 23. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d
1181, 1188, 1196 (11th Cir. 2003). In light of the recent charges of blackmail, the court
need not only to protect the interests of the absent class members, but also the interests of
the defendants. See infra Part VI.A.
78. Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 43.
79. Steven Glickstein et al., Does Daubert Apply to Class Certification Hearings?, in
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE STRATEGIES 423, 425 (PLI Litig.
Course & Admin. Practice Handbook Series No. H-695, 2003), available at WL 695 PLI/Lit
425.
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numerosity, commonality, predominance, and manageability.80 Conversely, defendants typically hire experts to counter those of the
plaintiffs and to opine that the class would be unmanageable if certified.81
B. Numerosity
Although in many cases the number of plaintiffs in a putative
class may be clear-cut, in complex cases expert evidence may substantially impact the size of a class action and demonstrate the necessary causal chain to establish the class representative’s standing
as a member of the class.82 No “bright line” test for numerosity exists,
and courts have certified classes with as few as thirteen members.83
The plaintiff must provide some evidence or reasonable estimate of
the number of purported class members to satisfy the numerosity
analysis.84 To provide evidence of numerosity in complex litigation,
plaintiffs may use statisticians, hydrologists, engineering geologists,
economic experts, or even atmospheric experts.85
The classic toxic tort case provides a helpful illustration since the
plaintiff may find it difficult to ascertain the number of potential
class members without expert testimony on the substance’s geographical reach.86 First, a toxic tort plaintiff may hire a professional
chemist with expertise in the particular substance to examine the activities surrounding the alleged release as well as the amount, tim-

80. See West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002).
81. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012
(7th Cir. 2002), rev’g in part 205 F.R.D. 503, cert. denied sub nom. Gustafson v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 537 U.S. 1105 (2003); Sherrie R. Savett, Trial and Preparation of a
Securities Class Action Fraud Case from a Plaintiff’s Standpoint, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 11, 14 (PLI Litig. Course Handbook & Admin. Practice Series No. H-509, 1994),
available at WL 501 PLI/Lit 11 (stating that defendants have abundant financial resources
that allow them to hire the most impressive and high-quality experts to defeat certification); see also infra Part III.D.
82. Williams, supra note 57, at 183.
83. See Dale Elecs., Inc. v. R.C.L. Elecs., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 534-36 (D.N.H. 1971).
But see Ashe v. Bd. of Elections, 124 F.R.D. 45, 52 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that eleven
class members were not numerous enough to merit subclass certification).
84. Expert witnesses are often necessary to determine numerosity in toxic tort cases.
See LeAnn Mercer et al., Applicability of Daubert Principles in Toxic Tort Cases, in ALIABA COURSE OF STUDY; HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES, SITE REMEDIATION, AND NEW AGE ENFORCEMENT 551, 564 (Oct 25-26, 2001).
85. See generally Williams, supra note 57, at 198-200 (discussing the use of chemists,
toxicologists, and medical experts in establishing causation).
86. Geographic distribution may play a considerable role when a small number of
class members exist and numerosity alone cannot establish the impracticability of joinder.
Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 80-81; see also Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 F.2d 859,
878 (11th Cir. 1986); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 95 F.R.D. 168, 175 (D. Del.
1982). For a transcript of a speech on toxic tort cases and the role of science, see Christopher H. Buckley, Jr., Toxic Tort Cases: Risk Assessment and Junk Science, 9 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 487 (2000).
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ing, and method of release.87 In the case of contaminated air, the expert would assess the number of plaintiffs in a contaminated area by
taking into account things such as wind and weather; in water contamination cases, a hydrologist might assess the number of people in
proximity to the affected sources.88 Experts may submit evidence in
the form of toxic dispersion maps of contaminated areas.89 For example, in O’Connor v. Boeing North American, Inc., the engineering geologist and hydrologist used this type of map to demonstrate how
chemicals dispersed from a lab through groundwater, migrated into
the surrounding neighborhoods, and exposed the community to toxic
substances.90
In addition to using experts to establish the extent of the chemical
release, the plaintiffs, and particularly the class representative, may
submit blood or urine to a doctor or technician to determine the individual’s toxic exposure through laboratory testing.91 The plaintiff
may then hire an atmospheric chemist to decide whether environmental factors altered the contaminant or whether it remained in its
original form once it entered the atmosphere.92 Finally, plaintiffs may
bring in yet another expert to conduct a “plume study” that defines
where and in what concentration the toxic materials traveled.93 This
study may help determine the geographical distance traveled by the
chemical and, consequently, the number of people affected.
Although defendants do not typically dispute numerosity,94 the
size of the class often directly influences the costs of the verdict or
settlement. Toxic tort claims, in particular, can involve entire communities, and may impact individuals differently according to the
time the individual spent in the community, the proximity to the
source of toxins, the length of exposure, and the amount of exposure.95 Consequently, the expert’s analysis may directly affect the
number of plaintiffs included in the class action. Plaintiff and de87. Williams, supra note 57, at 198-99.
88. Id.; see Christopher H. Buckley, Jr. & Charles H. Haake, Separating the Scientist’s Wheat from the Charlatan’s Chaff: Daubert’s Role in Toxic Tort Litigation, 28 ENVTL.
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10293, 10298 (1998).
89. See O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 320 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
90. Id. at 320. In O’Connor, residents who lived near a nuclear testing facility brought
a motion for class certification against the owner and operators of the facility based on an
alleged release of radioactive contaminants. Id. at 316-18. The district court certified the
class. Id. at 342.
91. Williams, supra note 57, at 199.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. The Eleventh Circuit has held that courts have an independent duty to inquire
into the evidence, even if the defendants do not contest its validity. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1188, 1196 (11th Cir. 2003).
95. See Ellen Relkin, Some Implications of Daubert and Its Potential for Misuse: Misapplication to Environmental Toxic Tort Cases and Abuse of Rule 706(a) Court-Appointed
Experts, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2255, 2260 (1994).
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fense counsel may want to vary the numbers depending on the litigation goals.96 Using the Daubert analysis to examine the validity of
each side’s expert may help the judge reach a more accurate number.
Conducting a Daubert analysis before admitting expert affidavits
would act as a barrier to unreliable evidence and prevent the court
from having to revisit the issue of standing or numerosity.97 Yet,
courts view Daubert with reluctance during certification.98 Although
the court in O’Connor devoted eight pages of its opinion to expert testimony establishing numerosity, it rejected a motion for a Daubert
hearing by claiming that the motion went to the merits of the case.99
C. Common Issues
In addition to proving numerosity, to certify a class, the plaintiffs
must enumerate specific questions of law or fact common to the
class.100 This commonality requirement in Rule 23(a)(2) often intertwines with the predominance evaluation of Rule 23(b)(3) and
“tend[s] to merge” with the typicality requirement.101 Although the
following two sections treat commonality and predominance separately, expert testimony on commonality may establish the foundation for predominance. If the plaintiffs establishe predominance,
commonality will always be present.
1. Commonality of Rule 23(a)(2)
The court must decide the threshold issue of commonality in Rule
23(a)(2) before it can further examine the predominance and superiority of commonality under Rule 23(b)(3).102 Commonality exists if
the plaintiffs “share at least one question of fact or law with the
grievances of the prospective class.”103 The class members need not
share all questions of law or fact,104 and plaintiffs can establish com-

96. Donald C. Arbitblit & William Bernstein, Effective Use of Class Action Procedures
in California Toxic Tort Litigation, 3 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 435, 444
(1996). Defendants often want to keep the numbers to a minimum for purposes of damages;
however, they may want to expand the size of the class for settlement purposes.
97. See Williams, supra note 57, at 201.
98. See O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 321 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
99. Id.
100. FED R. CIV. P. 23(a); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). Note
that when a class is too large, numerosity alone may establish impracticability and the
court need not look to any additional factors before refusing to certify the class. See, e.g.,
Finnan v. L.F. Rothschild & Co., 726 F. Supp. 460, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding joinder of
127 plaintiffs impracticable).
101. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n.13; Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 59.
102. Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 59.
103. Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994).
104. Midwestern Mach. v. N.W. Airlines, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 562, 569 (D. Minn. 2001) (citing Lockwood Motors, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 162 F.R.D. 569, 575 (D. Minn. 1995)).
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monality regardless of individual differences in damages.105 Since
commonality asks whether the issues are susceptible to classwide
proof, courts may refrain from closely scrutinizing the proof for fear
of venturing into the merits of the case.106
Some plaintiffs hire experts to develop a technique for implementing a common method of proof. In an antitrust suit by airline customers, for example, an economist might testify to whether a merger
caused a “substantial lessening” of competition within relevant markets, whether all of the class members suffered a common antitrust
injury, and whether the court could calculate damages using a common method.107 These expert reports might contend that an airline’s
airport market share rose significantly, that the airline’s airfares and
yields increased since the merger, and that entry barriers to a particular airport were too high.108 The economist could then conclude
that the increased airfares impacted all the passengers of a particular airport, thereby establishing commonality.109 Yet, if the economist
uses a flawed method for gathering information about the markets,
such as informally surveying ten airport passengers, then the
economist’s opinion on common proof would amount to little more
than conjecture and speculation.
2. Predominance of Common Issues in Rule 23(b)(3)
Although a plaintiff meets the commonality requirement “when
there is at least one issue, the resolution of which will affect all or a
significant number of the putative class members,”110 Rule 23(b)(3)
calls for the additional twin requirements of predominance and superiority.111 To predominate, these common issues must constitute a
“significant part” of individual cases,112 and the proposed class must
be “sufficiently cohesive.”113 The plaintiff must further prove that the
105. Id.
106. Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655, 666 (N.D. Ga. 2001); see
infra Part V.B.
107. See Midwestern Mach., 211 F.R.D. at 569. In Midwestern Machinery, airline passengers brought a suit against Northwest Airlines, Inc. alleging that Northwest’s merger
with Republic Airlines caused “a substantial lessening of competition in violation of” the
Clayton Act as well as a systemic practice of overcharging its customers. Id. at 564-65. In
response to a motion for class certification the judge admitted expert reports by an economist and a professor of civil procedure to help determine whether to certify the action. Id.
at 566-69. The judge certified the action as a Rule 23(b)(3) action and held that injunctive
class relief was not appropriate. Id. at 572.
108. See id. at 566.
109. See id.
110. Payne v. Don Bhon Ford, Inc., 1998 WL 131737, at *8 (E.D. La. March 20, 1998)
(quoting Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421, 426 (5th Cir. 1997)).
111. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
112. Jenkins v. Raymark Ind., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986); Payne, 1998 WL
131737, at *8.
113. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).
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issues in the class action “are subject to generalized proof, and thus
applicable to the class as a whole,” and that these collective issues
predominate over issues that require individualized proof.114
To establish superiority, the plaintiff must prove that a class action is the best method of achieving a “fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy.”115 The element of superiority reflects the main
purposes of the class action: preserving judicial resources and guarding against inconsistent results.116 Proving that one fundamental set
of facts predominates over particularized facts relevant to individual
claims often presents one of the main obstacles for plaintiffs seeking
Rule 23(b)(3) certification.117 To overcome this hurdle, plaintiffs use
experts to explain how the basic facts pertain to each plaintiff.118
For example, in Sanneman v. Chrysler Corp., the plaintiff tried to
use an expert to establish a common cause of paint delamination and
apply it to each putative class representative.119 Since the case
turned on whether Chrysler fraudulently concealed a paint defect,
the expert attempted to establish a sole cause for that defect.120 The
expert declared that “the cause for Ecoat basecoat delamination is
always ultraviolet rays,” but then hedged that “other causes may
contribute to or exacerbate the problem.”121 Notably, the court decided, without explanation, that the expert’s testimony survived the
Daubert analysis.122 However, the court denied certification because
“the experts [did] not agree that ultraviolet rays [were] always the
root cause of delamination, or that they ever [were] the only cause.”123
Since proof of injury would require a “vehicle-by-vehicle” assessment,

114. In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 2001)
(quoting Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2000)).
115. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
116. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983); Am. Pipe & Constr.
Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974); First Fed. v. Barrow, 878 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir.
1989). Ironically, when courts do not use a standard burden of proof, such as a preponderance of the evidence, this undermines the principle of guarding against inconsistent results, not between similar plaintiffs, but on a broad scale.
117. Davis & Kowalski, supra note 25, at 287.
118. Id.
119. 191 F.R.D. 441, 451 (E.D. Pa. 2000). In Sanneman, the class representative,
Christina Sanneman, brought a putative class action against Chrysler Corporation “on behalf of Illinois owners and former owners” of certain makes and models of cars for damages
allegedly incurred as a result of painting the vehicles with a defective prime coat. Id. at
443-44. On a motion for class certification, the judge held that although the plaintiff established numerosity, commonality and typicality, Christina Sanneman was not an adequate
class representative of new car owners, and individual issues would predominate over
common issues. Id. at 456. Consequently, the court ruled that the class action did not provide the superior method for resolving the claims. Id. at 456-57.
120. Id. at 451.
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 451 n.16.
123. Id. at 451.
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the generalized causation and proof did not predominate over individualized proof.124
Some courts provide a more hospitable environment for plaintiffs’
experts by relaxing the amount of proof needed to satisfy the Rule 23
requirements and by resolving ambiguities in favor of the plaintiff.125
In In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation, both parties
proffered reports by economists that gave competing opinions on
whether the plaintiffs could litigate their complex antitrust claims as
a class action.126 Even though the economists’ testimony offered opposing views on generalized proof, the district court admitted the
plaintiffs’ expert testimony for the purpose of supporting class certification because it was not “so flawed that it would be inadmissible
as a matter of law.”127 The district court refused to inquire into the
experts’ disagreement over conclusions of generalized proof even
though the disagreement raised the issue of whether the plaintiffs
actually met the Rule 23(b)(3) requirement.128 After refusing to address the difference of opinion, the court claimed that an evidentiary
dispute over the proof was not a valid reason to deny class certification.129 Although a dispute in and of itself is not a valid reason to
deny certification, if a court considers the disagreement, it could find
that the plaintiffs did not establish common proof, which is a valid
reason to deny certification.
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court and
stated that at the certification stage a trial court need ask only
“whether plaintiffs’ expert evidence is sufficient to demonstrate
common questions of fact warranting certification of the proposed
class, not whether the evidence will ultimately be persuasive.”130 As
such, the court admitted the plaintiffs’ expert testimony and refused
to consider the opposing expert’s opinion when evaluating the evidence.131 The Second Circuit did not furnish a standard for its district
124. Id. The court also denied certification because the class representative could not
adequately represent all the interests of the class. Id. at 456.
125. See, e.g., In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 134 (2d
Cir. 2001).
126. Id. In Visa Check/MasterMoney, large commercial retailers, retail associations,
and smaller merchants joined forces to bring an antitrust action that challenged the credit
card association’s rules requiring stores that accepted the association’s credit cards to also
accept their debit cards. Judge John Gleeson certified the class, and the credit card associations appealed to the Second Circuit. On appeal, the court affirmed the district court’s
certification. Id. at 129-32, 147.
127. Id. at 135.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. The court noted that it would not engage in the “statistical dueling” of experts. Id.;
see also In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 203 F.R.D. 197, 217 n.13 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“To the
extent that this discussion involves a battle of experts, it [sic] not appropriate for the Court
to determine which expert is more credible at this time.”). But see West v. Prudential Sec.,
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courts to use in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, but judging from the Circuit’s other preferences and instructions, sufficiency
appears to be a fluid requirement with little protection for defendants. This Circuit openly favors a liberal application of the requirements of Rule 23,132 encourages courts to err on the side of certifying
classes,133 does not require plaintiffs to state a cause of action,134 and
generally deems methodology that is not “fatally flawed” a sufficiently credible basis for certification.135
By refusing to “weigh conflicting expert evidence or engage in ‘statistical dueling’ of experts,”136 the Second Circuit appears to accept
the plaintiffs’ expert evidence as true for purposes of proof. The Supreme Court, however, requires “actual, not presumed conformance”
with Rule 23(a), and insists that courts conduct a “rigorous analysis”
to determine compliance.137 Although the Second Circuit employed a
limited Daubert analysis to determine whether the plaintiffs’ expert
testimony was fatally flawed,138 it should have applied a full Daubert
analysis given its subsequent weak scrutiny of proof and bias in favor
of certification.
Unlike the Second Circuit, the Third,139 Fifth,140 Seventh,141 and
Eleventh142 Circuits recognize that the court is not required to accept
Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002) (requiring the district courts to hold evidentiary
hearings to choose between competing expert perspectives if necessary).
132. See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1968); see also Korn v.
Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1208-09 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 182
F.R.D. 85, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
133. Green, 406 F.2d at 298; Sumitomo, 182 F.R.D. at 88.
134. The Supreme Court has stated that “the class determination generally involves
considerations that are ‘enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s
cause of action.’” Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978)).
135. Visa Check/MasterMoney, 280 F.3d at 135.
136. Id. Since the court did not take the defense expert’s testimony into account, no
“dueling” occurred and the court seemed to use the appearance of experts on both sides as
an excuse to certify the plaintiff. Davis & Kowalski, supra note 25, at 291. Rather than
performing its judicial function, the court basically gave “judicial power to the plaintiffs,
who can obtain certification just by hiring a competent expert.” West, 282 F.3d at 938.
Since courts allow defendants to submit evidence on their behalf, courts do not openly treat
the defendants as passive, dispassionate observers. Yet, when the court refuses to consider
the defendant’s opposing expert’s testimony and rejects Daubert challenges, the court
seems to relegate the defendant to a less active position.
137. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160.
138. Visa Check/MasterMoney, 280 F.3d at 132 n.4.
139. See, e.g., Johnston v. HBO Film Mgmt., Inc., 265 F.3d 178, 186 (3d Cir 2001). On
Rule 23(f) review, the Third Circuit has never allowed a class to stand. Jennifer K. Fardy,
Disciplining the Class: Interlocutory Review of Class Action Certification Decisions Under
Rule 23(f), 2003 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. CLASS ACTIONS & DERIVATIVE SUITS REP. 3, 9, available
at http://www.seyfarth.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/fardy.PDF (last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
140. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
141. But see In re Hartford Sales Practices Litig., 192 F.R.D. 592, 602 (D. Minn. 1999)
(“In determining whether class certification is appropriate under Rule 23, the court must
accept as true the allegations in the complaint.”).
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expert allegations in the complaint as true, but rather may make the
necessary factual and legal inquiries to verify that the plaintiff provided sufficient proof of the certification requirements.143 In accordance with the reading of General Telephone Co. v. Falcon,144 after
admitting the evidence, these courts weigh expert opinions offered by
both parties even if their inquiry into the underlying considerations
of Rule 23 overlaps the merits of the case.145
In Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., a securities fraud case, the Third Circuit carefully evaluated the offered
proof and discounted the plaintiffs’ expert evidence as an attempt to
“gloss over” the individual proof of injury requirement.146 The plaintiffs contended that their expert could present a mathematical formula to measure classwide damages,147 and could construct an allocation plan from this formula.148 Although the Newton court did not
conduct, or even mention, a Daubert analysis, it held that the expert’s plan was not an acceptable means to measure classwide damages.149 The court indicated that it would accept the proposed technique “when dealing with a misrepresentation or omission affecting
the securities market uniformly,” but the method could not be used
“as a means to arrive at some figure which can then be allocated
among the proposed class members, regardless of whether each
member suffered actual loss.”150 Translated into the terminology of
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the expert did not reliably
apply the technique to the facts of the case.151
142. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1188 (11th Cir. 2003) (requiring the court to conduct an independent inquiry into whether the plaintiffs met the
Rule 23 requirements even if the requirement is uncontested by defendants).
143. See, e.g., West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002); Szabo v.
Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001). The court in Szabo rejected the
Eisen rule as a bar to the “merits inquiry” when a look at the merits was relevant to one of
the Rule 23 requirements. Courts do not specify the burden of proof as a preponderance of
the evidence. However, since courts generally use this standard in civil cases and no cases
provide otherwise, it will be the presumed standard for purposes of this Comment.
144. 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982).
145. Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676. Courts should perform a full Daubert admissibility test for
the experts of both the plaintiff and defendant then decide whether a preponderance of the
evidence meets the requirements of Rule 23.
146. 259 F.3d 154, 188 (3d Cir. 2001). In Newton, investors wanted to certify a class
against their broker-dealers at Merrill Lynch for breaching their duty of best execution. Id.
at 162. The Third Circuit took the case on an interlocutory appeal, and held that although
the class met the requirements in Rule 23(a), it did not pass the superiority and predominance requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) so it could not be maintained as a class action. Id. at
193.
147. Id. at 188.
148. In re Merrill Lynch, 191 F.R.D. 391, 397 (D.N.J. 1999); see also Newton, 259 F.3d
at 188.
149. Merrill Lynch, 191 F.R.D at 397.
150. Id.
151. FED. R. EVID. 702. At least one of the district courts in the Third Circuit retreated
from this truth-finding approach to adopt the reasoning of the Second Circuit. See Nichols
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D. Manageability Problems
Although experts opining about numerosity and commonality
typically rely on scientific or technical data, experts employed to establish manageability rely on statutes and cases to give legal opinions on matters such as choice-of-law issues.152 In certifying a Rule
23(b)(3) class action, the court should consider, under Rule
23(b)(3)(D), the “difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.”153 Commonly known as “manageability,” this
factor often prevents the court from certifying putative nationwide
class actions that would require it to apply numerous state laws to
differing claims.154 Doing so would defeat the superiority of the class
action mechanism for resolving disputes.155
Defendants may claim that divergent state laws present “insuperable obstacles” by requiring the court to apply numerous states’ laws
as well as instruct jurors on each state’s law and the corresponding
class action claim.156 Plaintiffs typically respond by employing experts, usually law school professors or experienced attorneys, to produce methodology and reports contending that the variation among
the laws fails to predominate over common legal issues.157 The plaintiffs’ experts then conclude that legal difficulties are either nonexistent or negligible.158
v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. CIV.A. 00-6222, 2003 WL 302352 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29,
2003). In Nichols, the court held that the expert’s opinion did not need to satisfy the
Daubert requirements to be admissible at the class certification stage. Id. at *4. Instead,
the court quoted the Second Circuit as saying that the court, at the class certification
stage, “may not weigh conflicting expert evidence or engage in statistical dueling of experts.” Id. at *6.
152. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012
(7th Cir. 2002), rev’g in part 205 F.R.D. 503, cert. denied sub nom. Gustafson v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 537 U.S. 1105 (2003).
153. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
154. See, e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1012.
155. See, e.g., id. (decertifying a class action because the court would have to apply the
laws of all fifty states, thereby making the class unmanageable).
156. See, e.g., id.; Davis & Kowalski, supra note 25, at 286.
157. See Midwestern Mach. v. N.W. Airlines, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 562 (D. Minn. 2001).
158. Joel S. Feldman et al., Expert Witnesses in Insurance Class Actions and Individual Classes—Defense Perspective, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY; CONFERENCE ON LIFE
AND HEALTH INSURANCE LITIGATION 249, 271-72 (May 11-12, 2000); Davis & Kowalski, supra note 25, at 286. Judges are increasingly less hospitable to this type of “hired gun” expert. One court noted that:
[F]ar too frequently in the current legal system the use of professional expert
witnesses has become rampant. That is to say, that instead of utilizing professionals that work in a specific field to comment and give learned opinions on
certain subjects, attorneys turn to “guns for hire” whose main job or means of
living is generated from giving expert testimony. The Court fears that this
trend will result, if it has not already resulted, in supposed experts not utilizing
scientific methods to render an opinion but rather by twisting scientific methods to produce a result that will support the case of those footing the bill.
Rivera Pomales v. Bridgestone Firestone, Inc., 217 F.R.D. 290, 295 (D.P.R. 2003).
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The Third Circuit grants its district courts’ evaluation of manageability “a wide range of discretion” since a district court “generally
has a greater degree of expertise and familiarity [with manageability] than does the appellate court.”159 Despite this deference, the
Third Circuit hesitated to rely on the plaintiffs’ expert’s “formulaic
nostrum” due to the consequences of certifying an unmanageable
class.160 Certifying an unmanageable class wastes judicial resources,
precludes efficient adjudication, and undermines the function of the
class action mechanism.
Other courts, however, welcome the aid of legal scholars on legal
issues.161 The court, in Midwestern Machinery v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., accepted an affidavit from a dean and professor of civil procedure from the Hastings College of Law in spite of the plaintiffs’ claim
that the affidavit constituted an inadmissible legal opinion.162 To admit the affidavit, the court reasoned that the affidavit was not “pure
legal opinion” because it discussed the facts of the case and applied
the law.163
In In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. Tires Products Liability Litigation, a putative nationwide class action with plaintiffs that resided in
twenty-seven different states, the court welcomed relevant facts regarding the choice-of-law analysis.164 Choice-of-law usually bears directly on a class’s manageability.165 In Bridgestone/Firestone, one of

159. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 191 (3d Cir.
2001) (quoting Link v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., Inc., 550 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir. 1977)); In
re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1011 (3d Cir. 1986). However, not all appellate courts
are this permissive with regards to manageability. See, e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone, 288
F.3d at 1012.
160. Newton, 259 F.3d at 191. For a brief synopsis of the Newton case, see supra note
146.
161. See Midwestern Mach., 211 F.R.D. at 568-69.
162. Id. For a brief synopsis of the Midwestern Machinery case, see supra note 107.
163. Midwestern Mach., 211 F.R.D. at 568.
164. 205 F.R.D. 503 (S.D. Ind. 2001). In the Bridgestone/Firestone case, buyers and
lessees of Ford Explorer SUVs equipped with Firestone tires brought prospective class action complaints against both Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. and Ford Motor Company. Although the district court certified the class, Judge Easterbrook, on appeal, held that the
proposed class was not manageable either as a nationwide class action or as an action with
classes certified for each of the fifty states. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods.
Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002), rev’g in part 205 F.R.D. 503, cert. denied
sub nom. Gustafson v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 537 U.S. 1105 (2003).
165. Many plaintiffs attempt to simplify the legal framework for prosecuting state lawbased claims in nationwide class actions by simplifying the choice-of-law analysis. See
Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Class-Certification of Non-Federal Question Claims: Strategies for
Plaintiffs, in NON-FEDERAL QUESTION CLASS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL COURTS: PROSECUTION
& DEFENSE STRATEGIES 25, 33-35 (PLI Litig. Course & Admin. Practice Handbook Series
No. H-660, 2001), available at WL 660 PLI/Lit 25. Federal courts must apply the procedural laws of the forum state. The conflict-of-laws analysis is considered procedural, and
federal courts apply the forum state’s rules. See Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1015.
States use various methods to determine what law will apply to tort causes of action.
Methods for determining the choice-of-law include: the “interest analysis,” which applies
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the plaintiffs’ experts on legal matters claimed there was sufficient
uniformity across the states to try the class claims in a singular proceeding.166 The defendants maintained that it was “improper to offer
‘expert’ opinions on legal issues relevant to class certification.”167 The
district court disagreed. For purposes of proffered experts’ opinions,
the judge established “sufficient boundaries” around those opinions
to preclude the affidavits from “imping[ing] on [the court’s] judgment
or usurp[ing] [the court’s] own application of legal principles to the
facts and the issues.”168 On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit held
that a court could not manage the litigation as a nationwide or a
statewide class action.169 Consequently, it reversed the district court’s
decision to certify the class.170
Courts generally apply Federal Rule of Evidence 704 when admitting expert testimony relating to legal opinions.171 This rule expressly
permits testimony or opinions on the ultimate issue to be decided.172
However, the opinion must be helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule
704 “does not lower the bars so as to admit all opinions.”173 Tradithe law of the state whose interests would be more impaired if the court did not apply its
own state law; the doctrine of lex loci delicti, which applies the law of the place of the injury or wrong; the “significant relationship” test, which uses the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS to determine which state has a most significant relationship to both
the occurrence and the parties; the combined modern method, which applies the law of the
state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to the issue; the lex fori rule, which applies the law of the forum state; and the balancing test,
which applies the sounder rule of law. See Bates v. Superior Court, 749 P.2d 1367, 1369
(Ariz. 1988) (applying the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS); Washington
Mut. Bank, FA v. Superior Court, 15 P.3d 1071, 1078 (Cal. 2001) (applying an interest
analysis); Wardell v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 210 S.E.2d 854, 857 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974)
(applying the law of the place of the injury or wrong); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
549 A.2d 1187, 1191-92 (N.H. 1988) (applying a balancing test); Cooney v. Osgood Mach.,
Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277, 284 (N.Y. 1993) (applying the combined modern method). Generally,
within each state’s conflict-of-law provision, courts treat the choice-of-laws issue the same
for different types of torts. Courts that employ a balancing test may weigh some factors
more heavily depending on the type of tort claim. See Judge v. Am. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d
1565, 1568 (11th Cir. 1990).
166. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 503 (S.D.
Ind. 2001), order rev’d in part, 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002), cert denied sub nom. Gustafson v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 537 U.S. 1105 (2003).
167. Memorandum of Law In Support of Defendants’ Motion to Strike the Declarations
of Samuel Issacharoff & E. Hunter Taylor at 1, In Re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires
Prods. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 503 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (No. IP 00-9373-C-B/S, MDL No. 1373).
168. Transcript of Hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification, at 7-8, In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 503 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (No.
IP 00-9373-C-B/S, MDL No. 1373). The district court certified the class. Subsequently, the
Seventh Circuit decertified the class. Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1021.
169. Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1018. The Seventh Circuit held that the nationwide class was not manageable because claims would need to be adjudicated under the
laws of many different states. Id.
170. Id. at 1021.
171. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee’s note.
172. Id.
173. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee’s note.
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tionally, to use expert testimony the proponent must establish that
(1) the subject of the inference is so integrally “related to a science,
profession, business, or occupation” that it is beyond the knowledge
of the lay person and (2) that the witness has sufficient skill or
knowledge in the field about which he or she will testify.174 Although
judges retain some discretion in administering this rule,175 the danger in the class certification setting is that the judge will not apply
the rules at all. Thus far, courts have not strictly applied the Rules of
Evidence during class certification. Consequently, the court may admit expert legal opinions on manageability without employing the
evidentiary safeguards of Rule 702 or 704.
IV. THE USE OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IN CLASS
CERTIFICATION
Unquestionably, expert opinions on manageability and other certification requirements may help the judge rule on complex certification issues. As far back as 1901, Judge Learned Hand remarked,
“[n]o one will deny that the law should in some way effectively use
expert knowledge wherever it will aid in settling disputes. The only
question is as to how it can do so best.”176 In today’s technology filled
world, litigants increasingly rely on expert evidence.177 Yet, judging
from the courts’ inconsistent approaches to admitting expert affidavits, courts still grapple with how best to handle them.178 In deciding
how to address expert opinions during certification, courts should
first return to the goals and purposes of both the class action and the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence aim to secure fairness by promoting the growth and development of the laws
of evidence.179 Likewise, class actions seek to increase fairness by
eliminating inconsistent results.180
A. The Applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Pre-Daubert
Despite the straightforward aims of the class action and the Federal Rules of Evidence, the judiciary’s current refusal to apply the
rules in class certification hearings began with one judge’s misinterpretation of the rules.181 Federal Rules of Evidence 101 and 1101 gov-

174. STRONG, supra note 66, § 13, at 58-59.
175. Id.
176. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1901).
177. Dawson, supra note 1, at 2051; Kelly & Holley, supra note 1, at 6.
178. See infra Part IV.B.
179. FED. R. EVID. 102.
180. See First Fed. v. Barrow, 878 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 1989).
181. See Thompson v. Bd. of Educ., 71 F.R.D. 398, 401 n.2 (S.D. Mich. 1976), rev’d on
other grounds, 709 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983).
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ern the applicability of the rules, and apply them generally to civil
actions and proceedings.182 Rule 1101 contains specific exceptions for
things such as proceedings before grand juries.183 Even though Rule
1101 contains no exception for class certification hearings, a district
court judge decided that the evidence rules did not apply during certification.184
This judge presided over the case of Thompson v. Board of Education, in which the defendants objected that the plaintiffs’ evidence
did not meet certain foundational requirements.185 In denying the
motion to strike the evidence, the judge observed that Rule 1101(b)
states that the Rules of Evidence “apply generally to civil actions and
proceedings,” but decided that the rules “need not be viewed as binding during a hearing on such preliminary matters as class certification when a full scale evidentiary hearing may not be absolutely necessary.”186 The judge then quoted Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin out of
context and said:
In Eisen, the Court said that a class action hearing ‘of necessity . . .
is not accompanied by the traditional rules and procedures applicable to civil trials.’ . . . Such a view of the Rules is consistent with
Rule 102’s mandate to construe the Rules in a manner so as to
avoid unjustifiable expense and delay without negatively affecting
the just determination of the merits of the case.187

The judge omitted the beginning of the Supreme Court’s quotation,
which expressed a concern for protecting defendants.188 The beginning of the Court’s quote stated that “a preliminary determination of
the merits may result in substantial prejudice to a defendant” since
such a hearing may not employ traditional rules.189 The Court never
clarified which “traditional rules” would be missing.190
The judge in Thompson disregarded the bias and prejudice inherent in an unreliable evidentiary foundation, and refused to take a

182. FED. R. EVID. 101, 1101(b).
183. Id. at 1101(d)(2).
184. Thompson, 71 F.R.D. at 401 n.2. In Thompson, female teachers brought a Title
VII action against multiple Michigan school districts to challenge the schools’
sick/disability leave provisions. The teachers alleged that the provisions treated pregnancy
differently than other temporary disabilities. The district court certified the case as a class
action. Id. at 418.
185. Id.
186. Id. (internal quotations admitted). But see Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Bank, N.A.,
880 F.2d 928, 938 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying the Federal Rules of Evidence in a Rule 23
fairness hearing); see also infra note 199.
187. Thompson, 71 F.R.D. at 401-02 n.2 (internal citation omitted).
188. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974).
189. Id.
190. Id.
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closer look to avoid “unjustifiable expense and delay.”191 The caveat is
that Federal Rule of Evidence 102 also provides that the evidentiary
rules “shall be construed to secure fairness in administration.”192 The
view that employing the Rules of Evidence during certification hearings will cause unjustifiable expense and delay fails to consider the
increased use of experts at this stage, the time consumed in decertifying a class erroneously certified on unreliable expert testimony, the
possibility of appealing certification decisions, and the coercion to
settle after certification.193
By refusing to conduct a proper Daubert analysis, the court adds
unjustifiable expense and delay by allowing plaintiffs with flawed
evidence to proceed to trial.194 This holds true particularly in light of
some courts’ willingness to both resolve doubts in favor of the plaintiffs and certify classes with less than a preponderance of the evidence.195 In today’s context, continued refusal to employ safeguards
for evidentiary reliability undermines fairness in administration and
actually leads to continued delay through certification appeals.196
The better view of the Rules of Evidence comes from the rules
themselves. According to Rule 101, the Federal Rules of Evidence
“govern proceedings in the courts of the United States . . . to the extent and with the exceptions stated in rule 1101.”197 Rule 1101 does
not list “class certification hearings” among its exceptions.198 The
Seventh Circuit, in Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., held
that the Federal Rules of Evidence applied to proceedings under Rule
23 and specifically noted that “[f]airness hearings conducted under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) are not among the proceedings excepted from
the Rules of Evidence.”199
191. FED. R. EVID. 102; Thompson, 71 F.R.D. at 401-02 n.2. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure also provides that the rules “shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
192. FED. R. EVID. 102.
193. See infra Part VI.A.
194. Courts may certify a class based on flawed evidence so long as the evidence is not
so flawed as to be inadmissible as a matter of law. Vickers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 204
F.R.D. 476, 479 (D. Kan. 2001).
195. See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Sumitomo Copper
Litig., 182 F.R.D. 85, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig.,
170 F.R.D. 524, 531-32 (M.D. Fla. 1996); In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R.D. 682, 68889 (D. Minn. 1995).
196. See, e.g., In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d
Cir. 2001) (hearing and granting an appeal to decertify a class action); see also infra note
317.
197. FED. R. EVID. 101.
198. See id. at 1101(d).
199. 880 F.2d 928, 938 (7th Cir. 1989). In Mars, Judge Easterbrook observed: “The
Federal Rules of Evidence ‘govern proceedings in the courts of the United States . . . to the
extent and with the exceptions stated in Rule 1101.’ The exceptions, listed in Rule 1101(d),
include proceedings such as extradition and sentencing in criminal cases.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Due, in part, to the Supreme Court’s lack of clarification in Eisen
as to which “traditional rules” would be missing from class certification,200 courts admit expert evidence that lacks the evidentiary safeguards typically employed during trial. Courts use Eisen as a justification for both disregarding the Federal Rules of Evidence and making certification decisions without weighing the substance or amount
of offered proof.201 This combination contradicts the goals and purposes of both the class action mechanism and the Federal Rules of
Evidence. As a result, judges have certified classes based on newspaper articles and hearsay.202
B. Judicial Treatment of Daubert in Recent Years
Although conducting a Daubert analysis before admitting expert
evidence would foster the restoration of fairness and the goals of the
class action, many courts refuse to use Daubert during class certification. This reluctance, however, has not prevented litigants from raising Daubert challenges to the admissibility of expert affidavits.203
These challenges received various levels of rejection and only limited
success. Yet, the courts’ rationale for rejection provides insight into
how to dispel their Daubert concerns.
200. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974).
201. See, e.g., Visa Check/MasterMoney, 280 F.3d at 135 (holding that the plaintiffs’
expert’s testimony is only inadmissible if it is so flawed as to be inadmissible as a matter of
law and refusing to engage in the “statistical dueling” of experts); In re Microcrystalline
Cellulose Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. 79, 83 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (refusing to consider the Federal Rules of Evidence at the class certification stage); In re St. Jude Med., Inc. Silzone
Heart Valves Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 01-1396 JRTFLN, 2003 WL 1589527, at *11 (D.
Minn. March 27, 2003) (refusing to analyze the evidence of the medical expert under
Daubert); Nichols v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. Civ.A. 00-6222, 2003 WL 302352, at
*4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2003) (holding that the plaintiffs’ expert’s testimony need not be sufficient under Daubert to be admissible); Thomas & Thomas Rodmakers, Inc. v. Newport Adhesives & Composites, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 159, 162 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (denying defendant’s motion to strike and employing only a lower Daubert standard); Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg.,
Inc., 205 F.R.D. 466, 478 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (admitting testimony to show commonality that
was sufficient only to make a marginal showing of commonality); Midwestern Mach. v.
N.W. Airlines, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 562, 565-66 (D. Minn. 2001) (allowing Daubert only to the
extent that it prevents methodology that is “so apparently flawed”).
202. Paxton v. Union Nat’l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 562 n.14 (8th Cir. 1982) (“Hearsay testimony may be admitted to demonstrate typicality.”); see In re Hartford Sales Practices
Litig., 192 F.R.D. 592, 597 (D. Minn. 1999) (concluding that considering newspaper articles
during class certification is appropriate); David Minvielle, Comment, Use of the Hearsay
Objection in Class Certification Hearings to Promote Preliminary Evaluation on the Merits
of the Case, 45 LOY. L. REV. 585, 600 (1999).
203. The scope of this Comment is limited to federal class actions, however many state
courts have addressed the same issues. See, e.g., Earnest v. Amoco Oil Co., 859 So. 2d
1255, 1258-59 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (holding that the expert’s methodology did not show
class injury or establish questions of law or fact common to the proposed class); Howe v.
Microsoft Corp., 656 N.W.2d 285, 295 (N.D. 2003) (stating that it was not appropriate to
engage in a Daubert analysis during certification); In re S.D. Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 657
N.W.2d 668, 675 (S.D. 2003) (applying a lower Daubert standard to determine whether the
expert’s testimony rests on both a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand).
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1. Daubert Denied
A number of district courts dismiss Daubert motions during class
certification as premature. One court feared that this sort of analysis
went to the merits of the case and denied the defendant’s motions.204
In another court, the defendants contended that the plaintiffs’ expert
based his opinion on unreliable methodology.205 Not only did this district court refuse to evaluate the expert’s methodology, it stated that
“[o]n a motion for class certification, the Court cannot, and indeed
should not, engage in the [Daubert] analysis.”206 Therefore, before
trial the defendants filed a motion to exclude the plaintiffs’ expert
witness and supported this motion with their own MIT expert.207 Denying the motion again, the court remarked that “Chief Justice
Rehnquist surely did not intend the proceeding he created in Daubert
to devolve into yet another battle of the experts.”208
Although the court in Vickers v. General Motors Corp. also declined to engage in a Daubert analysis, it noted that “a court should
not ‘certify a class . . . on the basis of an expert opinion so flawed that
it is inadmissible as a matter of law.”’209 The Vickers court seemed to
balance this minimal standard for admitting expert evidence with a
local Kansas rule that required the plaintiff to present an evidentiary
basis demonstrating that the action was “properly maintainable.”210
The plaintiffs’ expert admitted during the hearing that his report re204. O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 321 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
205. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 229, 234 (D. Minn.
2001).
206. Id.
207. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., No.Civ. 00-MDL-1328(PAM), 2003
WL 244729, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2003). This citation refers to the hearing on the defendants’ motion to exclude the plaintiffs’ expert witness after certification. The court notes
that proponents of an expert witness must prove admissibility by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. (citing Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 686 (8th Cir. 2001)).
208. In re Monosodium Glutamate, 2003 WL 244729, at *1. It was actually Justice
Blackmun, not Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the majority opinion in Daubert. Justice
Rehnquist filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part with the majority. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 598 (1993). Justice Rehnquist
joined the majority opinion in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, which Justice Breyer authored. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Justice Breyer states, “[w]e conclude that Daubert’s general
holding—setting forth the trial judge’s general ‘gatekeeping’ obligation—applies not only to
testimony based on ‘scientific’ knowledge, but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and
‘other specialized’ knowledge.” Id. at 141. The court makes no reference to, and consequently, no exception for a “battle of the experts.”
209. 204 F.R.D. 476, 479 (D. Kan. 2001). In Vickers, property owners who lived near
the General Motors plant brought an action against General Motors for damaging their
land and cars by releasing sulphuric acid into the air. On the motion for class certification,
the district court held that owners’ proposed definition of the class, although subject to refinement based on further development, was insufficient to support certification. Id. at
478. In addition, the judge noted that the owners’ expert relied on a diagram which he did
not understand and the opposing expert’s model provided persuasive contrary evidence. Id.
at 478-79.
210. Id. at 479.
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lied on evidence with various flaws.211 Consequently, the court denied
class certification since the proposed class definition lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis.212
2. Formal Daubert Analysis Rejected but Courts Claim to
Scrutinize the Evidence
Some courts reject a strict application of Daubert; however, as
stated by the court in Bacon v. Honda of America Manufacturing,
Inc., they “will carefully scrutinize [the] expert testimony to determine whether it in fact supports the certification of a class in [the]
case.”213 True to its word, the Bacon court scrutinized the evidence
and denied class certification.214 If a court refuses to conduct a full
Daubert analysis, then it should at least follow Bacon and seriously
analyze the proffered evidence to decide whether the plaintiff proved
the requirements of Rule 23 by a preponderance of the evidence.215
Although the court in In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litigation also claimed it would carefully scrutinize the plaintiffs’ evidence,216 unlike Bacon, it fell short of its own standard. The court began by postponing a Daubert analysis until trial, and proposed a
“new” evidentiary inquiry for use during class certification.217 This
query asked whether the expert methodology “will comport with the
basic principles of econometric theory, will have any probative value,
and will primarily use evidence that is common to all members of the
proposed class.”218 Translated into “Daubert terminology,” the court
examines the reliability and relevance of the expert’s methodology.
211. Id. at 478.
212. Id. at 479.
213. 205 F.R.D. 466, 471 (S.D. Ohio 2001); see also In re St. Jude Med., Inc. Silzone
Heart Valves Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 01-1396 JRTFLN, 2003 WL 1589527, at *11
n.14 (D. Minn. Mar. 27, 2003) (citing Bacon, 205 F.R.D. at 469-71). In Bacon, AfricanAmerican employees brought an employment discrimination suit against Honda, alleging
that Honda engaged in a pattern and practice of minority discrimination. The court denied
their motion for class certification since the employees did not establish the requirements
of Rule 23(a) with respect to the disparate treatment claims. 205 F.R.D. at 490.
214. Bacon, 205 F.R.D. at 490.
215. Bacon did not specify what burden of proof was used to evaluate the sufficiency of
the evidence.
216. 996 F. Supp. 18, 26 (N.D. Ga. 1997). Litigants in this case sought damages and
equitable relief pursuant to the Clayton Act as a remedy for alleged violations of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. The plaintiffs alleged that there was a conspiracy to artificially
maintain the price of polypropylene carpet and motioned for class certification. The district
court granted the motion. Id. at 30.
217. Id. at 26.
218. Id. Ironically, this same court failed to mention its own test four years later when
it refused to address “the full panoply of issues relevant to the Daubert analysis.” Reid v.
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655, 661 (N.D. Ga. 2001). In Reid, the court
refused to certify the class since the expert “admitted in his deposition that his reports contain[ed] numerous errors including mathematical mistakes, the inclusion of wrong and
misleading tables, counting as zeros disparities that really were not zeros, and missing an
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In its Rule 23(b)(3) analysis, the court required the plaintiffs to
produce “sufficient evidence” to support a “reasonable conclusion”
that they would use common evidence.219 Yet, the court did not insist
that the plaintiffs eliminate the possibility that the common evidence
(the pricing structure) moved in different directions, which would
completely undermine predominance.220 Nor did the court require the
plaintiffs’ expert to prove the existence of a pricing structure with
any statistical evidence.221 Instead, the court “readily agree[d]” that
the plaintiffs’ evidence might not establish a common relationship,
but noted that the evidence was not “worthless” or “inherently
faulty” so it certified the class.222 Although it initially seemed that
the court would actually weigh the evidence to determine whether
the plaintiffs offered sufficient proof to support a reasonable conclusion of predominance, the court ultimately certified the class with a
cursory review of unsubstantiated, speculative evidence.
A Pennsylvania district court relied on the analysis in In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litigation as persuasive precedent that
courts need not ever consider whether an expert’s opinion would be
admissible under Daubert during certification.223 In reaching this
conclusion, the judge reasoned that a Daubert inquiry would inappropriately require plaintiffs to fully evaluate all of their data at the
preliminary stage of class certification.224 While it may be true that
plaintiffs should not have to evaluate all data prior to certification, to
the extent that the plaintiffs rely on both the data and the experts
interpreting and collecting the data to satisfy the Rule 23 requirements, they should prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the evidence sufficiently supports those requirements. To require less
allows the court to certify classes with varying levels of proof on an
ad hoc basis, which undermines consistency and could promote the
type of forum shopping among federal circuits that occurs in state
courts.225

implied decimal that rendered some of the disparities incorrect and changed some of the
variances.” Id.
219. Polypropylene Carpet, 996 F. Supp. at 24.
220. Id. at 23.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 24-25, 29, 30.
223. Nichols v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. CIV. A. 00-62222003 WL 302352, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2003). In Nichols, the plaintiffs brought an antitrust suit against
SmithKline Beecham Corporation under the Clayton Act. They alleged that SmithKline
violated the federal antitrust laws by stockpiling and causing patents to be listed with the
Food and Drug Administration in a way that allowed SmithKline to indefinitely extend its
monopoly on Paxil. Id. at *1. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.
Id. at *9.
224. Id. at *4.
225. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship: Is
There Smoother Sailing for Class Actions in Gulf Waters?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1709 (2000).
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3. Daubert Analysis Limited but Noted
A number of courts are willing to perform a “limited” Daubert
analysis.226 Courts tailor this narrow inquiry “to the purpose for
which the expert opinion is offered.”227 Consequently, the court addresses whether it “may utilize [the expert’s testimony] in deciding
whether the requisites of Rule 23 have been met.”228
The Second Circuit applies a limited Daubert analysis, but grants
certification if the plaintiffs demonstrate at least a “colorable method
of pro[of],” or if the “proposed methods are so insubstantial as to
amount to no method at all.”229 The Second Circuit refused to weigh
the opposing experts’ opinions even though they offered entirely contradictory views on whether the plaintiffs met their burden of satisfying Rule 23.230 Although a limited Daubert analysis provides some
protection, the leniency with which the court considered the evidence
undermined the initial protection. If a court conducts only a limited
Daubert analysis, it should seriously scrutinize and evaluate all the
evidence so it can make a fully informed decision on whether the
plaintiffs’ evidence more likely than not satisfies Rule 23. In addition, the court should not err on the side of certification when it performs only a cursory review of the offered proof.231
Nevertheless, a district court in California favorably interpreted
the Second Circuit’s limited analysis and, in Thomas & Thomas
Rodmakers, Inc. v. Newport Adhesives & Composites, Inc., agreed
that a “lower Daubert standard should be employed.”232 To support its
proposition, the court declared that “an inquiry into the admissibility
of the proposed expert testimony under Daubert would be an inappropriate consideration of the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.”233 The
court further proffered that “an expert report should not be excluded
merely on the basis that it assumes the substantive allegations of the
complaint rather than relying upon actual data that may yet to be
discovered.”234 This reasoning disregards the Supreme Court’s re226. See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68, 77 (E.D.N.Y.
2000), aff’d, 280 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 536 U.S. 917 (2002); Midwestern Mach. v. N.W. Airlines, Inc., 211 F.R.D.
562, 565-66 (D. Minn. 2001) (stating that the application of Daubert is “somewhat limited
at this stage”).
227. Visa Check/MasterMoney, 192 F.R.D. at 77.
228. Id.
229. In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2001)
(citing In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R.D. 682, 687 (D. Minn. 1995)).
230. Id.
231. Some courts err on the side of certification. See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291,
298 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 182 F.R.D. 85, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
232. 209 F.R.D. 159, 162 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 163. But see In re Hartford Sales Practices Litig., 192 F.R.D. 592, 602 (D.
Minn. 1999) (“In determining whether class certification is appropriate under Rule 23, the
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quirement of actual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23,235 ignores the court’s independent duty to inquire whether the plaintiffs
met their burden,236 and takes no notice of the Supreme Court’s directive to consider the merits to the degree necessary to determine
compliance with Rule 23.237
4. Daubert Applied
Two district courts, one in the Fifth Circuit and one in the Third
Circuit, actually applied a full Daubert analysis during class certification.238 In Sanneman v. Chrysler Corp., the district court indicated
in a footnote that it concluded, prior to the hearing, that the proposed
expert’s testimony “was proper under Daubert and the Federal Rules
of Evidence.”239 A Texas district court provided more details of its
Daubert analysis in McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd.240 In a full
written opinion, the court explained how it used Daubert to examine
each of the defendants’ contentions in their motion to strike the
plaintiffs’ expert opinion.241 Because of Daubert, the court held that it
would not consider the plaintiffs’ expert’s methodology to determine
the efficiency of a particular securities market since the method “had
not been subjected to peer review, and was not shown to be generally

court must accept as true the allegations in the complaint.”); Lockwood Motors, Inc. v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 162 F.R.D. 569, 573 (D. Minn. 1995).
235. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
236. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1188 (11th Cir.
2003).
237. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.12 (1978) (quoting
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3911, at 485 n.45
(1976)).
238. See McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., No. 5:97-CV-159, 2002 WL 32076175 (E.D.
Tex. Sept. 30, 2002); Sanneman v. Chrysler Corp., 191 F.R.D. 441 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
239. 191 F.R.D. at 451 n.16; see also Kelly & Holley, supra note 1, at 6. For additional
information on the Sanneman case, see supra note 119.
240. 2002 WL 32076175, at *1. This citation refers only to the court’s response to the
defendants’ joint motion to strike the opinions and testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert. The
plaintiffs’ alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are
commonly known as “10b-5 claims.” To prove a 10b-5 claim, the plaintiffs must show “(1) a
material misstatement or omission (2) which occurred in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities (3) that was made with scienter (4) harm, and (5) causation.” Id. (quoting
Mercury Air Group, Inc. v. Mansour, 237 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2001)). Since the causation element required reliance, the plaintiffs used the fraud-on-the-market doctrine. Id.
According to this doctrine, “where materially misleading statements have been disseminated into an impersonal, well-developed market for securities, the reliance of individual
plaintiffs on the integrity of the market price may be presumed.” Id. (quoting Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988)). Consequently, the plaintiffs offered an expert opinion
on what constituted an efficient market for purposes of the plaintiffs’ fraud-on-the-market
theory. The court admitted the expert’s opinion, with the exception of his “random walk
analysis.” Id. at *6.
241. Id.
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accepted by economists.”242 The court did, however, admit all other
aspects of the expert’s opinion.243
Although this Section presented Daubert challenges as a progression of success, in reality, no uniformity or clear development exists
in the courts. Daubert challenges, though frequently rejected, remain
“hit or miss.” Until courts recognize the need to conduct a full
Daubert analysis, litigants should argue that expert opinions are inadmissible as a matter of law and lack a proper factual foundation.244
The defense should also consider asking the court to appoint its own
panel of experts under Federal Rule of Evidence 706.245 Experts appointed under Rule 706 may assist the court in deciding the ultimate
causation issue.246
The courts’ varied approaches to Daubert largely reflect a misguided reluctance to venture near the merits of the case and a lack of
awareness of the resulting inconsistencies of requiring variable levels
of proof. Some judges may simply be unsure about how to accurately
apply the Federal Rules of Evidence during certification since the
rules do not traditionally permit affidavits. Since courts accept affidavits during class certification and summary judgment and use both
methods to discard frivolous civil cases, examining how the courts
employ the Rules of Evidence during summary judgment provides
one illustration of how Daubert could function as a means for excluding unreliable testimony during certification.
V. TOWARD A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO EXPERT EVIDENCE
IN CLASS CERTIFICATION
The heavy reliance on expert testimony via affidavits and the necessity of avoiding a mini-trial during certification makes it impossible to implement the Federal Rules of Evidence in the same manner
as they are used during trial. However, the summary judgment process applies the rules in a way that ensures evidentiary safeguards
and efficiency. Both summary judgment and class certification proceedings show a trend of using expert affidavits as evidence.247 Summary judgment, like class certification, presents a mechanism for
dismissing meritless claims, limiting harassment of defendants, and
242. Id. at *6.
243. Id. at *7.
244. See Vickers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 204 F.R.D. 476, 479 (D. Kan. 2001) (noting that
during certification, the court should not admit expert testimony that is “so flawed that it
is inadmissible as a matter of law”); Dawson, supra note 1, at 2051.
245. FED. R. EVID. 706.
246. See Patrick Lysaught, Forces Shaping Mass Tort Litigation: Strategies for Defense
Counsel, 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 165, 170 (2000). Judge Pointer, in the Alabama breast implant
litigation cases, used a Rule 706 panel to address a Daubert challenge. Id.
247. Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment Materials, 147 F.R.D. 647, pt. VI (1993);
Davis & Kowalski, supra note 25, at 285.
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conserving judicial resources.248 In fact, at its outset, summary judgment faced many of the same policy and institutional growing pains
that now confront class certification.249 Consequently, even though
class certification addresses more of a jurisdictional question and
summary judgment a procedural one, summary judgment provides a
starting point for discussion on how to implement evidentiary rules
in certification.
A. The Rules of Evidence in Summary Judgment as a Framework
for Class Certification
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which regulates summary
judgment motions, allows the court to enter summary judgment
when the pleadings, affidavits, and other papers on file demonstrate
that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.250 Judges typically
hold hearings for both class certification and summary judgment.251
During summary judgment, litigants frequently depend on expert
opinions to demonstrate issues of material fact;252 however, if those
opinions are unreliable, then the issue of material fact may be nothing more than smoke and mirrors. Consequently, at the summary
judgment stage, expert affidavits must comply with the Federal
Rules of Evidence.253 To help the court evaluate reliability, Rule 56(e)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits opposing counsel to
submit alternative expert evidence to discredit or challenge the
plaintiff’s affidavits.254
When parties challenge expert opinions, the court may grant
summary judgment on two grounds: (1) when, under Daubert and
Kumho Tire,255 evidence essential to the plaintiff’s case is inadmissible, or (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain a jury verdict.256 In
this first situation, the judge must apply Rule 702 to determine

248. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982); Douglas M. Towns, Note, MeritBased Class Action Certification: Old Wine in a New Bottle, 78 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1003
(1992).
249. See Towns, supra note 248, at 1020.
250. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
251. Mullenix, supra note 16, at A14; William W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment and
Expert Evidence, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY; OPINION AND EXPERT TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS, 295, 298 (April 3-4, 2003).
252. See Brunet, supra note 247, at pt. VI.
253. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e) (“Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”).
254. Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) permits affidavits “to be supplemented or
opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits.” Id.
255. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
256. Schwarzer, supra note 251, at 297.
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whether the expert is testifying to scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge to assist the judge in understanding the evidence
or to determine a fact at issue.257 If the court decides that the “scintilla of evidence . . . is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true, the court remains
free to . . . grant summary judgment.”258 Similarly, during class certification, the judge should weigh all the evidence to decide whether
the plaintiffs provided sufficient proof, as judged by a preponderance
of the evidence standard, to satisfy Rule 23’s requirements.
Courts may grant summary judgment after excluding expert evidence that supplied an essential element of the case.259 Admissibility
of expert testimony under Daubert and sufficiency of the evidence involve two distinct but associated inquiries. Admissibility concerns
whether the court will allow a party to introduce the evidence during
trial (expert evidence must pass Daubert prior to admission);260 sufficiency asks the court to evaluate the expert’s conclusions and decide
whether the combined evidence adequately introduces a jury question.261 After a Daubert evaluation for reliability and relevancy,262 the
judge may consider expert affidavits that either bolster or supply entirely the sufficiency of the evidence.263
Likewise, parties in the class certification context should be able
to submit expert affidavits to contest or support the requisites of
Rule 23 only after the affidavits survive a Daubert analysis.264 The
judge should then evaluate the expert’s conclusions and decide, after
considering all of the evidence, whether the plaintiffs’ combined evidence more likely than not satisfies each of the prerequisites in Rule
23.
Just as the plaintiff must prove the Rule 23 requirements for class
certification, the plaintiff, to prevent the court from granting summary judgment for the defendant, must come forward with sufficient
evidence of an essential element of the claim.265 In summary judgment, conflicts in expert evidence and inferences must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, which, in this scenario, would be the plaintiff.266 In class certification, if the court de-

257. FED. R. EVID. 702. The issue in class certification is whether the plaintiff meets
the requisites of Rule 23.
258. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
259. Schwarzer, supra note 251, at 298.
260. Id. at 299.
261. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1132 (2d Cir. 1995).
262. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
263. Schwarzer, supra note 251, at 299.
264. For an admonishment to district courts for considering only the plaintiffs’ expert
testimony, see West v. Prudential Sec., Inc. 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002).
265. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
266. Joint E. & So. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d at 1124, 1137.
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pends on Daubert safeguards and scrutinizes the evidence in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence standard, it could then
resolve ambiguities in favor of the plaintiff. In neither summary
judgment nor class certification should the judge accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true;267 indeed, this level of deference to
plaintiffs exists only in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.268
Unlike Rule 12(b)(6) motions,269 the court at the class certification
stage must conduct a “rigorous analysis” in which it may need to address questions that are “intimately” involved with the merits.270 By
refusing to conduct any analysis of the opposing expert opinions,
courts fail to adequately evaluate all of the evidence and seem to use
Eisen’s merit inquiry prohibition as a supportive crutch.271 The rules
of Civil Procedure endow district courts with substantial authority to
conduct a comprehensive analysis.272 Appellate courts review Daubert
decisions, even at the summary judgment stage, on an abuse of discretion standard,273 which gives the judiciary substantial latitude to
rule on evidentiary matters and to produce a well-informed certification decision.
Regardless of the virtues of this approach, some may argue that
summary judgment’s evidentiary procedures should not apply during
class certification because the plaintiff has not completed discovery.
Although the summary judgment process allows plaintiffs to finish
discovery and present the totality of their evidence, the plaintiff preparing for class certification has also already engaged in extensive
discovery.274 Courts should limit discovery to the issues necessary to

267. See generally West, 282 F.3d at 938. But see In re Hartford Sales Practices Litig.,
192 F.R.D. 592, 602 (D. Minn. 1999) (“In determining whether class certification is appropriate under Rule 23, the court must accept as true the allegations in the complaint.”).
268. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
269. See In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98, 106 (D.C. Cir.
2002); McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., No. 5:97-CV-159, 2002 WL 32076175, at *3 (E.D.
Tex. Sept. 30, 2002) (noting that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “differs significantly” from a class
certification hearing).
270. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982) (stating that courts
must conduct a rigorous analysis to determine whether the plaintiff met all of the Rule
23(a) requirements for certification); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.12
(1978) (noting that some of the questions that involved determining the appropriateness of
class certification are “intimately” involved with the merits of the case). In the Eleventh
Circuit, the court has a duty to independently evaluate whether the plaintiffs met their
burden on each Rule 23 requirement, even if uncontested by the defendant. Valley Drug
Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1188 (11th Cir. 2003).
271. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) (prohibiting a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a case during class certification).
272. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d).
273. Even though summary judgment is typically reviewed de novo, rulings on admissibility under Daubert are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136, 147 (1997).
274. Crump, supra note 17, at 7; Savett, supra note 81, at 33 (“Defendants will raise a
myriad of objections to avoid and stall the production of documents. Nevertheless, courts
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a certification determination;275 however, plaintiffs often seek broad
discovery on the merits to develop fundamental aspects of their case
prior to certification.276 As noted by the Manual for Complex Litigation, “[b]ifurcating class and merits discovery . . . can result in duplication and unnecessary disputes among counsel over the scope of discovery.”277 The 2003 advisory committee notes to revised Rule 23 observed, “[a]lthough an evaluation of the probable outcome on the
merits is not properly part of the certification decision, discovery in
aid of the certification decision often includes information required to
identify the nature of the issues that actually will be presented at
trial.”278 The notes advise that “[i]n this sense it is appropriate to
conduct controlled discovery into the ‘merits,’ limited to those aspects
relevant to making the certification decision on an informed basis.”279
Consequently, the committee encourages “active judicial supervision”
to “achieve the most effective balance that expedites an informed certification determination without forcing an artificial and ultimately
wasteful division between ‘certification discovery’ and ‘merits discovery.’”280 In the past, district courts have enjoyed considerable discretion in determining the scope of discovery in class certification;281
however, failure to permit discovery on class certification issues may

generally permit plaintiff[s] to pursue extensive discovery provided the documents being
sought are relevant.”). But see Midwestern Mach. v. N.W. Airlines, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 562,
566 (D. Minn. 2001) (stating “[i]t would be inappropriate, however, for a court to look beyond the methodology and critique the prospective results of its application to a complete
set of data. A party and its experts should not be expected to have fully evaluated all data
at the preliminary stage of class certification.” (citations omitted)). For more information
on discovery issues in class certification, see James F. Jorden, Discovery and Evidentiary
Issues in Non-Federal Question Class Actions, in NON-FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS 2002:
PROSECUTION & DEFENSE STRATEGIES 439 (PLI Litig. Course & Admin. Practice Handbook
Series No. H-679, 2002), available at WL 679 PLI/Lit 439.
275. Stephen H. Kupperman, Discovery and Evidentiary Issues in Non-Federal Question Class Actions, in NON-FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
STRATEGIES 373, 377 (PLI Litig. Course & Admin. Practice Handbook Series No. H-660,
2001), available at WL 660 PLI/Lit 373.
276. Id. at 377. However, experts retained in anticipation of litigation that will not be
testifying in a future trial may not be compelled to provide information during discovery to
the opposing side. See Ludwig v. Pilkington N. Am., Inc., No. 03 C 1086, 2003 WL
22242224, slip op. at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2003) (holding that environmental consultants
hired by a glass manufacturer, but who didn’t expect to testify at trial cannot be compelled
to provide information to residents suing for arsenic contamination), class cert. granted,
2003 WL 22478842, slip op. at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2003).
277. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30.12 (1995).
278. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Villar v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 990 F.2d 1489, 1495 (5th Cir. 1993); Stewart v.
Winter, 669 F.2d 328, 331 (5th Cir. 1982); see, e.g., Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Corp., 509 F.2d
205, 209 (9th Cir. 1975).
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constitute an abuse of discretion, particularly in light of the 2003 revisions to Rule 23.282
In ruling on summary judgment motions, courts have effectively
employed Daubert and the Rules of Evidence to help them navigate
the gray area of highly specialized issues, and to separate cases with
issues of material fact from meritless claims.283 By subjecting evidence presented at the certification stage to similar evidentiary procedures, the court may lighten its judicial burden by making more informed decisions, provide consistency within the federal courts, and
consequently restore the legitimacy of the class action.
B. The Case for Evidentiary Rules in Class Certification
Before three vital Supreme Court cases, the summary judgment
process contained almost as many gray areas and uncertainties as
does class certification. The summary judgment trilogy, Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,284 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,285 and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,286 expanded and clarified
the use of summary judgment. These cases continue to supply trial
courts with the necessary means to promote efficiency and fairness
while avoiding unjustifiable expense and delay in accordance with
Rule 102.287 Before these cases, courts took a more restrictive approach toward summary judgment.288 This restrictive approach is
mirrored in the class certification context, except that certification
remains on the cusp of transition.
Most courts faced with evidentiary concerns during certification
evade Daubert challenges by claiming that this asks them to travel
into the prohibited area of “merit inquiry.”289 Courts have not uni282. See, e.g., In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1086 (6th Cir. 1996); Chateau de
Ville Prod., Inc. v. Tams-Witmark Music Library, Inc., 586 F.2d 962, 966-67 (2d Cir. 1978);
Yaffee v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1367 (1st Cir. 1972), questioned by Dionne v. Springfield
Sch. Comm., 340 F. Supp. 334, 335 (D. Mass 1972). In Valley Drug Co. v Geneva Pharmaceuticals., Inc., the court held that denying a request for “downstream recovery,” discovery
relating to the wholesalers’ sales practices, constituted an abuse of discretion because the
record to decide the issue of whether the class met the prerequisite of Rule 23(b)(3) was incomplete. 350 F.3d 1181, 1195 (11th Cir. 2003).
283. Daubert challenges have become increasingly fatal to cases with unreliable evidence. See LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST., CHANGES IN THE
STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE
DAUBERT DECISION xvi (2001).
284. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
285. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
286. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
287. FED. R. EVID. 102; see also Towns, supra note 248, at 1028.
288. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (heavily distinguished)
(adopting Judge Frank’s approach in Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 475 (2d Cir. 1946)).
289. See, e.g., In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d
Cir. 2001); Thomas & Thomas Rodmakers, Inc. v. Newport Adhesives & Composites, Inc.,
209 F.R.D. 159, 162-63 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“It is clear to the Court that a lower Daubert
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formly applied the restriction against an inquiry into the merits,290
which has produced a hodgepodge of discretionary decisions that lack
a principled justification.291 When conducting a rigorous analysis in
complex cases,292 district courts must often examine more than just
the pleadings to understand the claims, defenses, facts, and applicable substantive law before “mak[ing] a meaningful determination of
the certification issues.”293 This examination does not stop when the
court encounters an expert opinion.
Judge Easterbrook, of the Seventh Circuit, recognized this need to
evaluate expert testimony during certification in an opinion reversing and reprimanding a district court judge.294 He began by noting
that the judge “thought [a] clash [between economists] enough by itself to support class certification and a trial on the merits.”295 However, according to Easterbrook, that limited support “amount[ed] to a
delegation of judicial power to the plaintiffs, who [could] obtain class
certification just by hiring a competent expert.”296 Accordingly, he
emphasized that a district court judge “may not duck hard questions
by observing that each side has some support,”297 and concluded that
“[t]ough questions must be faced and squarely decided, if necessary
by holding evidentiary hearings and choosing between competing
perspectives.”298 Although Judge Easterbrook did not specifically
mention Daubert, his point is clear: district courts have a duty to inquire into the relevancy and reliability of expert testimony during
certification regardless of whether that inquiry leads them into a
battle of the experts or the case’s merits.299

standard should be employed at this stage of the proceedings. Courts have declined to engage in a Daubert analysis at the class certification stage of an action on the ground that
an inquiry into the admissibility of the proposed expert testimony under Daubert would be
an inappropriate consideration of the merits of the plaintiff’s claims.”); O’Connor v. Boeing
N. Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 321 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (noting that the defendant’s request
for a Daubert analysis is inappropriate because it is directed at the merits of the plaintiffs’
claims).
290. An inquiry into the merits is prohibited by Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 178 (1974).
291. Bone & Evans, supra note 20, at 1254; Davis & Kowalski, supra note 25, at 289.
292. Courts must conduct a rigorous analysis of the Rule 23(a) requirements. Gen. Tel.
Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982).
293. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1996).
294. See West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).
295. Id. at 938. This is precisely what the Second Circuit does. See In re Visa
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2001).
296. West, 282 F.3d at 938.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1188, 1195 (11th Cir.
2003).
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The Supreme Court intended Daubert to apply to all proceedings
with expert testimony.300 Daubert protects “the trier of fact,” which
indicates that the safeguard applies equally to the judge or the jury,
from flawed evidence and ensures that the decision-maker considers
only relevant and reliable expert testimony.301 One court dodged
Daubert by concluding that it was not a trier of fact at the certification hearing since it could not engage in a merit inquiry.302 The
Daubert analysis, however, is not an inquiry into the merits; it functions to shield the judicial process from flawed testimony, not to seek
the truth of the claims.303 In response to one set of plaintiffs’ allegations that striking their expert affidavit would go to the merits of the
case, the court in In re Ford Motor Company Ignition Switch Products Liability Litigation, stated that it did not examine the plaintiffs’
expert reports “with the intent of determining the likelihood of any of
the parties prevailing at trial,” but instead “read those documents in
order to determine the contours of the issues that would be involved
in such a trial.”304
Although most courts refuse to conduct a full Daubert analysis
during certification, courts allow litigants to make a Daubert challenge against the same experts and the same evidence during trial.305
If the expert’s opinion or method does not withstand Daubert at trial,
and the court suddenly realizes that it cannot manage all the claims
under differing state laws or that common claims do not predominate, it must then decertify the class.306 The court could have prevented the additional time and expense of a trial had it conducted a
Daubert inquiry during certification. This roundabout process con300. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-92 (1993)
(using the broad terminology “trier of fact” rather than “jury”).
301. See id. at 591-92.
302. See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney, 192 F.R.D. 68, 76 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“I am very
far from the ‘trier of fact’ contemplated in Rule 702. Indeed, I am expressly forbidden from
engaging in ‘a preliminary inquiry into the merits of the case.’”), aff’d, 280 F.3d 124 (2d
Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 536 U.S. 917
(2002).
303. Davis & Kowalski, supra note 25, at 293.
304. In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 345
(D.N.J. 1997), vacated in not relevant part, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22891 (D.N.J. July 27,
1999). In Ford, plaintiffs wanted to certify a class action on behalf of purchasers or lessees
of vehicles that allegedly caught fire because of a defective ignition switch. Id. at 337. A
second class of purchasers and lessees whose vehicles did not catch fire also wanted to certify their action as a class action. Id. at 338. The district court, however, denied certification to both groups because they failed to demonstrate the predominance and superiority
requirements for Rule 23(b)(3) certification. Id. at 356. The court also refused the plaintiffs’
request to provide them with conditional certification. Id.
305. See Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 466, 471 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
306. The Third Circuit has certified classes with the caveat that, if the case becomes
unmanageable, it may decertify or redefine the class. See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up
Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 815 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Sch. Asbestos
Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1011 (3d Cir. 1986).
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tradicts the rationale for using class actions in the first place: to
promote judicial economy and efficiently resolve multiple claims.307
Some courts liberally construe the class certification requirements
and hold that “if there are doubts at the certification stage those uncertainties should be resolved in favor of certifying the class.”308 This
position reflects the flexibility in Rule 23(c), which allows the court to
issue conditional certification orders and then alter or amend them
before deciding the merits.309 However, as the Supreme Court indicated, “actual, not presumed conformance with Rule 23(a) remains
. . . indispensable.”310 Consequently, courts should not use this flexibility as a means to certify a class that fails to satisfy the prerequisites of Rule 23.
When contemplating a certification decision in favor of certifying
the class, courts should consider both Rule 102 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, which requires judges to construe the rules to eliminate
unjustifiable expense and delay,311 and Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which directs judges to construe and administer the
rules “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action.”312 Even the Supreme Court observed that the principal
purpose of the class action procedure is “the efficiency and economy
of litigation.”313 If the class is certified without “significant proof” of
the Rule 23(a) requirements,314 then decertified at trial, the court’s
initial certification decision undermines the principal purpose of the
class action mechanism.315

307. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982).
308. In re Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D 79, 93 (E.D. Pa. 2003)
(citing Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 785 (3d Cir. 1985)); see also Kidwell v. Transp.
Communications Int’l Union, 946 F.2d 283, 305 (4th Cir. 1991); Black v. Rhone-Poulenc,
Inc., 173 F.R.D. 156, 159 (S.D. W. Va. 1996) (“The recent trend in class certification decisions is to interpret Rule 23 flexibly and give it a liberal construction.”). Although a class
may be conditionally certified under Rule 23(c)(1), the Rules say nothing about resolving
uncertainties in favor of the class. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. In Microcrystalline, the plaintiffs,
who purchased microcrystalline cellulose, which is an “inert binding agent in pharmaceutical and vitamin tablets,” filed suit against the sellers. Microcrystalline, 218 F.R.D. at 81. In
the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, they alleged antitrust violations. Id. The district court granted the motion for class certification, stating, “[t]he Court of Appeals has
held that if there are doubts at the certification stage those uncertainties should be resolved in favor of certifying the class.” Id. at 93.
309. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1).
310. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160.
311. FED. R. EVID. 102.
312. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
313. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538,
553 (1974)).
314. Id. at 159 n.15.
315. Id. at 159 (stating that the efficiency and economy of litigation is the principal
purpose of the class action).
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Without Daubert safeguards, resolving doubts in favor of certification ignores the consequences of certification for the defendant,316
wastes judicial resources, increases the expense of the action, and
causes delays while the defendant appeals a possibly uninformed and
unjust certification.317 Federal courts of appeal recently granted
thirty-two of forty-one certification appeals, and decertified the vast
majority of those classes.318 The appellate courts upheld the district
courts’ class certification in only five instances.319 Although these figures indicate that the appeals process in Rule 23(f) appears to be
working properly, the reversal of this many cases indicates that the
appellate courts may not approve of the district courts’ permissive
approach to certification.320
Like summary judgment, class certification provides a method for
conserving judicial resources by avoiding multiple suits.321 Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1) reserves the class action mechanism
for situations in which joinder is unavailable, which reinforces the
emphasis on fostering judicial economy.322 When courts decline to use
a Daubert inquiry during certification and later discover that the expert’s unreliable opinion led them to erroneously certify the class, the
class action wastes judicial resources and is not the most efficient
means of adjudication. If the district courts conducted a Daubert inquiry prior to admitting evidence or if they at least considered and
evaluated all of the evidence against a preponderance of the evidence
standard, they could avoid squandering judicial resources on a class
that does not sufficiently prove the requirements of Rule 23(a).323

316. See infra Part VI.A.
317. See West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 937-38 (7th Cir. 2002) (handling
an appeal from class certification and noting the need for resolving the appeal promptly).
Federal circuit courts have granted thirty-two of forty-one Rule 23(f) petitions (appeals
from orders granting or denying class action certification). Fardy, supra note 139, at 9. The
“vast majority” of these decisions decertified the class. Id.
318. Fardy, supra note 139, at 9.
319. Id.
320. The Second Circuit does not seem to mind the permissive approach to certification
and encourages its courts to err on the side of certifying the class. See Green v. Wolf Corp.,
406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1968) (“[I]f there is to be an error made, let it be in favor and not
against the maintenance of the class action, for it is always subject to modification should
later developments during the course of the trial so require.”).
321. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974); see Crown, Cork & Seal
Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 351 (1983).
322. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). Other factors besides simple numbers play into determining the feasibility of joinder. These include “(1) the nature and complexity of the action,
(2) the size of individual claims, and (3) the geographic distribution of the members of the
class.” JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 16.2 (3d ed. 1999) (footnotes omitted).
323. Daubert challenges have become increasingly fatal to cases. See DIXON & GILL,
supra note 283, at xvi.
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VI. THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF CLASS ACTIONS
At their core, class actions serve three vital purposes: (1) preserving judicial resources and increasing judicial economy;324 (2) protecting the rights of consumers who would not pursue individual claims
due to expense, reticence, or ignorance;325 and (3) guarding against
the possibility of inconsistent results.326 Although the class action
mechanism retains the potential for fairly and efficiently adjudicating multiple claims,327 it can also “put considerable pressure on the
defendant to settle, even when the plaintiffs’ probability of success on
the merits is slight.”328 Congress has proposed a number of bills,
many titled “Class Action Fairness Acts,” to move class actions from
state to federal courts where Congress believes there will be greater
consistency.329 Yet, with their already overburdened dockets, the federal courts cannot afford to waste judicial resources on trials arising
from erroneously certified classes, much less on classes removed from
state courts.330 Employing Daubert during certification can both mitigate the “blackmail” charge by dismissing frivolous class actions and
act as a tool for conserving judicial resources in the event that Congress passes a class action fairness act.331
A. Blackmail Settlements
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide safeguards to ensure fair
proceedings,332 yet as seen previously, federal courts refuse to employ
them during certification.333 The resulting prejudice to defendants
led, in part, to prominent judges reversing certification decisions that

324. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 553; See Parker, 462 U.S. at 351.
325. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985); Kramer v. Scientific
Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1091 (3d Cir. 1976); Brown v. Cameron-Brown Co., 92 F.R.D.
32, 49-50 (E.D. Va. 1981); Shields v. First Nat’l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442, 445 (D. Ariz. 1972).
326. First Fed. v. Barrow, 878 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 1989).
327. Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class
Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2000).
328. Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999).
329. For a discussion of moving class actions into federal courts, see John H. Beisner &
Jessica D. Miller, They’re Making a Federal Case Out of It . . . in State Court, 25 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 143 (2001); see also Mullenix, supra note 225.
330. See CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2002 YEAR-END REP. ON THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY pt. II, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/yearend/2002year-endreport.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2004).
331. On October 22, 2003 the Senate rejected, by one vote, the cloture motion for the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2003. Ralph Lindeman, Class Action Bill: Senate Motion to
Consider Class Action Bill Fails by One Vote; Dodd, Landrieu Key Votes, 4 Class Action
Litig. Rep. (BNA) 768 (Oct. 24, 2003). Senator Mary Landrieu cast the key vote defeating
the bill and explained that even though she “remained firmly committed to class action reform,” she did not receive certain crucial changes. Id.
332. FED. R. EVID. 102.
333. See supra Part IV.B.
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fostered what they considered blackmail.334 Once plaintiffs certify
their class, they may coerce or “blackmail” defendants into settlement.335 Lax certification standards risk high litigation and settlement costs by inviting frivolous, weak class action suits.336 Plaintiffs
may capitalize on these lenient standards to gain an undue advantage in negotiating settlements.337 As a result, the plaintiffs’ recovery
may not reflect the merits of their claims so much as it does the defendants’ fear of staking their financial viability on the outcome of a
single jury trial.338 Rather than face the possibility of devastating
damage awards and potential bankruptcy,339 risk averse defendants
often prefer to settle.340
Notably, Judge Posner, in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,341 and
Judge Easterbrook, in both West v. Prudential Securities, Inc.342 and
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,343 commented disapprovingly on
how the class action device has turned into a medium for blackmail.344 Judge Posner indicated alarm over the demonstrably weak
proof of the plaintiffs’ claims as compared to the tremendous litigation and liability risks for the defendant.345 Judge Easterbrook voiced
a similar concern that settlements “reflect [a] high risk of catastrophic loss” and force “defendants to pay substantial sums even when
the plaintiffs have weak positions.”346 Consequently, “[t]he effect of a
class certification in inducing settlement to curtail the risk of large

334. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1016,
1021 (7th Cir. 2002), rev’g in part 205 F.R.D. 503, cert. denied sub nom. Gustafson v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 537 U.S. 1105 (2003); West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d
935, 937, 940 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299, 1304
(7th Cir. 1995).
335. See, e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1016; West, 282 F.3d at 937; RhonePoulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1299.
336. Bone & Evans, supra note 20, at 1254.
337. Towns, supra note 248, at 1029.
338. Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 327, at 1390.
339. More than a dozen corporations involved in asbestos litigation sought protection
in the bankruptcy courts, as did companies involved in the Dalkon Shield and silicone
breast implant litigation. Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179,
188 (2001).
340. Bone & Evans, supra note 20, at 1254; Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 327, at 1390.
341. 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995).
342. 282 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2002).
343. 288 F.3d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir. 2002).
344. But see In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 145, 147 (2d
Cir. 2001) (certifying a class despite its potential coercive effect).
345. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1299.
346. West, 282 F.3d at 937 (citing Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A
Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991); Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO.
L.J. 1733 (1994); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?,
7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 61 (1991)).
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awards provides a powerful reason to take an interlocutory appeal.”347
Judge Easterbrook reiterated this position in In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. by remarking that the consequences of aggregating millions of claims “makes the case so unwieldy, and the stakes
so large, that settlement becomes almost inevitable—and at a price
that reflects the risk of a catastrophic judgment as much as, if not
more than, the actual merit of the claims.”348 Although some scholars
have debated the reality of this position,349 using Daubert before admitting expert evidence combined with weighing the evidence to
judge whether it satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 by a preponderance of the evidence will allow courts to parse through weak
claims and strengthen the fairness and efficiency of the class action
mechanism. Requiring reliable expert opinions early in the process
could lessen the opportunity for blackmail on weak claims and restore the positive functions of the class action mechanism.350
B. The Class Action Fairness Acts
One of the most important functions of the class action is the
preservation of scarce judicial resources.351 As Chief Justice
Rehnquist observed in his 2002 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, the federal courts are operating with insufficient resources
and cannot bear any additional burden.352 He explains:
Despite a substantial increase in workload, the number of judgeships in the Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, and Ninth
Circuits has not increased for 18 years—since 1984. During that
time period, appellate filings in the First Circuit have risen 56%,
in the Second Circuit they have risen almost 70%, and in the
Ninth Circuit appellate filings have more than doubled—rising
almost 115%.353

Congress may soon exponentially amplify the burden on the already
overtaxed judiciary if it passes a class action fairness act.354 Although

347. Id.
348. 288 F.3d at 1016.
349. See, e.g., Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) (suggesting that the cases make questionable or unproven factual allegations regarding wrongful coercion of defendants).
350. The three noble purposes of the class action mechanism are listed at the beginning of Part VI, supra.
351. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974) (stating that the efficiency and economy of litigation is the principal purpose of the class action).
352. See REHNQUIST, supra note 330, at pt. II.
353. Id.
354. For information on past bills, see Glenn A. Danas, The Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999: Another Congressional Attempt to Federalize State Law, 49 EMORY
L.J. 1305 (2000).
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the federal judiciary stringently opposes the act since it already lacks
sufficient operational resources,355 Congress continues to introduce
different forms of the bill each year.356 Each version of the act differs,
but the core provision in each implements a concept of “minimal diversity.”357 Minimal diversity expands federal court jurisdiction over
large interstate class actions by requiring that only one plaintiff and
one defendant reside in different states.358 In the most recent version
of the act, if minimal diversity exists, any defendant or any plaintiff
may remove the action from state to federal courts without the consent of all the defendants or all the plaintiffs.359
The Senate recently rejected, by one vote, a cloture motion to
bring the Class Action Fairness Act of 2003 to its floor.360 This close
defeat encouraged supporters to quickly create a similar bill that
might attract one additional vote.361 If Congress actually passes a
version of the class action fairness act, the federal judiciary will have
to find a means to reduce the strain on its court system.362 Just as the
courts developed and expanded the use of summary judgment to dispense with meritless claims and conserve judicial resources, the
courts could fairly dispense with frivolous class actions by subjecting
experts to a Daubert analysis during certification and weighing the
evidence offered to prove the requirements of Rule 23 in accordance
with the preponderance of the evidence standard.
A recent study of Daubert’s impact in the courts indicates that
challenges to expert evidence have become increasingly fatal to
cases.363 The study noted that once judges fulfilled their role as

355. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 1115 Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 123 (2003) (statement of Rep. John Conyers).
356. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, S. 274, 108th Cong. (2003); Class Action Fairness Act of 2002, H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. (2002); Class Action Fairness Act of
2001, S. 1712, 107th Cong. (2001); Class Action Fairness Act of 2000, S. 353, 106th Cong.
(2000); Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999, H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. (1999).
357. See S. 274, § 4.
358. See id.
359. Id. § 5(a).
360. Lindeman, supra note 331, at 768. Senate supporters of the bill think that a bill
could still be passed this session. Ralph Lindeman, Class Action Bill: Provisions in Senate
Class Action Bill Said in Conflict with Federal Notice Rules, 4 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP.
(BNA) 815 (Nov. 14, 2003). For more information on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2003,
see Representative John Conyers, Jr., Class Action “Fairness”—A Bad Deal for the States
and Consumers, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 493 (2003); Martha Neil, New Route for Class Actions: Proposals Raise Questions About Whether Giving Federal Courts More Power Over
Cases Will Cure the System’s Ills, 89 A.B.A. J. 48 (2003).
361. Lindeman, supra note 331, at 768.
362. The RAND Institute for Civil Justice recommends increasing judicial resources.
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS:
PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 36 (1999). The Institute notes, “[s]aving
money on damage class actions by limiting judicial scrutiny is a foolish economy that has
the long-term consequence of wasting society’s resources.” Id.
363. DIXON & GILL, supra note 283, at xvi.
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“watchful gatekeepers,” they examined all aspects of the evidence
more closely and rigorously assessed its reliability.364 Consequently,
if the federal courts employ Daubert at the class certification stage,
they could effectively eliminate both unreliable evidence and unsubstantiated class actions while lightening their overburdened docket.
VII. INHERENT FLEXIBILITY: JUDGES’ BROAD AUTHORITY
TO PREVENT REPETITION
The district courts already possess the authority to conduct a
Daubert inquiry and weigh the evidence offered to prove the requisites of Rule 23 during class certification. Appellate courts review
certification decisions on an abuse of discretion standard,365 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d) allows the court to determine the
course of the proceedings.366 When viewed in light of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 1, which directs courts to administer the rules to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action,”367 the district courts have a greater responsibility to use their
authority to eliminate inconsistent views of “sufficiency” and to make
more informed certification decisions.
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d)
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognized
the need for flexibility and fashioned Rule 23 to endow district courts
with significant discretion.368 According to Rule 23(d), the court has
authority to “prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument,” and to ensure “fair conduct of the action.”369 Rule 23(d)(3), in particular, specifically allows courts to impose additional conditions on the class representative as the circumstances warrant.370 The court can also fashion appropriate orders to
deal with “procedural matters.”371 The Federal Rules of Evidence are
considered procedural in nature.372 Accordingly, these explicit grants

364. Id. at xv.
365. E.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 703 (1979); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva
Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 2003); In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 132 (2d Cir. 2001); Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211
F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2000); Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283,
291 (2d Cir. 1999).
366. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d).
367. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
368. Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43
F.R.D. 39, 39 (1967).
369. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d).
370. Id. at 23(d)(3).
371. Id. at 23(d)(5).
372. Feldman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 2003).
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of power allow the court not only to employ the Federal Rules of Evidence, but also to control all aspects of class certification.
In short, drafters of Rule 23 aimed to conserve judicial resources
and to provide a procedural vehicle for aggregating multiple claims.
The class certification requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b) are
framed in general terms to empower the courts with the flexibility to
apply the requirements to an expansive array of claims.373 Rule 23(d)
gives judges broad discretion to assure fair and just adjudication.374
Using evidentiary rules and a uniform burden of proof to evaluate
sufficiency during certification promotes fair and just adjudication by
acting as a barrier to the admission of unreliable expert testimony as
well as to certifying classes with insufficient proof.
B. Abuse of Discretion Standard
In addition to the authority granted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d), appellate courts review district court decisions on class
certification using an abuse of discretion standard.375 Rule 23(f) allows courts of appeal to grant interlocutory orders to review the district court’s grant or denial of class action certification.376 Appellate
courts have broad discretion over whether to accept a Rule 23(f) petition.377
Since no “hard-and-fast test” exists for determining whether to
grant a Rule 23(f) petition, intermediate appellate courts consider
several factors.378 These factors may include whether the case raises
a novel or unsettled question,379 the likelihood of success on the merits,380 the posture of the case,381 and the “death-knell” factor, which
373. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (b).
374. See id. at 23(d).
375. See In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 953, 960 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, sub nom.,
N.W. Airlines Corp. v. Chase, 123 S. Ct. 2252 (2003). The Second Circuit is “noticeably less
deferential to the district court when that court has denied class status than when it has
certified a class.” Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 291 (2d Cir. 1999)
(quoting Lundquist v. Sec. Pac. Auto. Fin. Servs. Corp., 993 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1993)). In
Caridad, present and former African-American employees brought a Title VII race discrimination action against Metro-North Commuter Railroad. Id. at 283. The district court
denied class certification. Id. The Second Circuit reversed the denial of class certification
because the district court credited Metro-North’s expert evidence over that of the plaintiffs’
expert. Id. at 293. Accordingly, the court held that “[s]uch a weighing of the evidence is not
appropriate at this stage in the litigation.” Id.
376. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
377. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying class action certification under
this rule if application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order.”).
378. Delta, 310 F.3d at 959.
379. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note; In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate
Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98, 99-100 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (considering review “when the certification decision presents an unsettled and fundamental issue of law relating to class actions”).
380. Delta, 310 F.3d at 960.

1090

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1041

recognizes that the costs of continuing litigation for either party may
present a difficulty.382 Consequently, Rule 23(f) appeals should be the
exception, not the norm.383 However, by granting thirty-two of fortyone class certification appeals and decertifying all but five, the appellate courts seem to strongly indicate that the district courts should
substantially inquire into whether the plaintiff actually provided sufficient evidence of the Rule 23 requirements.384
All of these factors and considerations can lead to one result: the
district court should use its authority to conduct a full Daubert
analysis prior to admitting expert evidence. District court judges
should also use their authority to weigh the evidence when conducting a rigorous analysis to determine whether the plaintiff met, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the prerequisites of Rule 23. Then the
court could fairly resolve ambiguities in favor of the plaintiff and err
on the side of certification.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As the reliance on experts becomes routine during class certification, district courts need to respond to preserve both the proper purposes of the class action and the overarching need for just and fair
resolution of the case. Ideally, to make a fair and informed decision
on certification, judges should routinely apply Daubert as a precursor
to admitting expert evidence, adequately evaluate opposing expert
opinions, and use a preponderance of the evidence standard to judge
the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ evidence before resolving ambiguities
in favor of the plaintiffs and erring on the side of certification.385
Courts have a duty to exclude unreliable and irrelevant testimony
from consideration. Using Daubert during certification is an effective
means of reducing the number of frivolous class actions, increasing
judicial economy, preventing blackmail, bolstering the legitimacy of
class actions, and restoring the noble and practical purposes of the
class action device.

381. If it looks as though the district court will reexamine its decision to certify the
class, appellate courts are less likely to grant interlocutory appeals. Id.
382. See Lorazepam, 289 F.3d at 99; Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832,
834 (7th Cir. 1999).
383. Delta, 310 F.3d at 959-60; Lorazepam, 289 F.3d at 105.
384. See Fardy, supra note 139, at 9.
385. The burden of proof during class certification has not been previously addressed in
court cases. However, since the typical burden of proof in civil cases is a preponderance of
the evidence, courts should require plaintiffs to prove that they have more likely than not
met the requirements of Rule 23. See supra Part II.B.

